Background
In litigation brought by Erica Milton, Quincy Milton, and Johnny Milton against Cardiovascular Institute of The South, AAC, LLC, SWS Enterprises, Inc. and Houston Specialty Insurance Company sought supervisory review of a ruling by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish.
On December 18, 2025, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of SWS and Houston Specialty. The writ disposition does not provide additional details about the accident or the plaintiffs’ allegations. Judge Miller’s dissent states that SWS had completed its work and relinquished custody, or garde, of the premises approximately six weeks before the accident.
The Court’s Holding
The First Circuit denied the application for supervisory writs. Because the court issued only a summary writ denial, it did not provide reasons or adopt a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Judge Miller dissented, stating that he would reverse the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to SWS and Houston Specialty. Although he concluded that the undisputed evidence entitled those defendants to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2317, and 2317.1, he reasoned that any separate contractual-indemnification obligation would not support assigning them a percentage of fault in this matter.
Key Takeaways
- The First Circuit denied SWS and Houston Specialty’s supervisory-writ application, leaving the challenged summary-judgment ruling undisturbed.
- The court’s summary disposition supplied no majority reasoning and established no detailed analysis of the merits.
- Judge Miller distinguished potential contractual-indemnification liability from tort fault under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315, 2317, and 2317.1.
Why It Matters
The disposition illustrates the limited guidance provided by a summary denial of supervisory review: the lower-court ruling remains in place, but the appellate court does not explain its reasoning or expressly endorse the district court’s analysis.
The dissent also highlights a distinction relevant to construction and premises cases—whether a contractor may owe contractual indemnification is analytically separate from whether the contractor may be assigned tort fault after completing its work and relinquishing custody of the premises.