Background
This litigation arose from a fee-sharing dispute between two attorneys, Jonathan C. Pedersen and D. Douglas Howard, Jr., following the termination of their professional relationship. The specific issue involved over $2.2 million in attorney’s fees from a case known as the Endurance settlement. Pedersen filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that Howard was not entitled to any portion of this fee. In response, Howard claimed the two had a joint venture agreement that entitled him to a share of revenues.
Howard successfully obtained a writ of sequestration from the trial court, ordering Pedersen to deposit two-thirds of the disputed fee ($1,504,773.91) into the court’s registry to prevent its disposal during the lawsuit. Pedersen filed a motion to dissolve this writ, arguing Howard had no right to the funds. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Pedersen’s motion to dissolve. However, the court, on its own initiative, reduced the amount to be sequestered to one-half of the fees ($1,128,580.44). Pedersen then sought review from the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal granted Pedersen’s writ, reversed the trial court’s judgment, and dissolved the writ of sequestration. The court emphasized that sequestration is an “extremely harsh remedy” that requires strict and literal compliance with all legal formalities. Once a defendant moves to dissolve the writ, the burden shifts to the plaintiff who obtained it to prove the specific facts justifying the seizure.
After reviewing the evidence from the hearing, the appellate court found that Howard had failed to meet this burden. He did not provide conclusive evidence of a formal, written joint venture agreement, either generally or specifically for the Endurance case. While there was evidence of prior fee-sharing arrangements, they were inconsistent, and both parties had stated in a separate lawsuit that fee sharing was done only on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, the court held that the trial court committed a legal error by reducing the amount of the sequestration after the motion to dissolve was filed. Citing Louisiana Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that a conservatory writ cannot be amended to cure a deficiency once a motion to dissolve has been filed; the writ must stand or fall as originally issued. Because Howard failed to prove his grounds, the writ had to be dissolved entirely.
Key Takeaways
- A writ of sequestration is a harsh remedy, and the party who obtains it bears the burden of proving the grounds for its issuance if challenged by a motion to dissolve.
- Failure to prove the existence of a clear agreement entitling a party to the sequestered property will result in the writ’s dissolution. Inconsistent past practices may not be sufficient to establish such an agreement.
- A trial court cannot amend a writ of sequestration (e.g., by reducing the amount) after a motion to dissolve has been filed. The writ must be dissolved if the grounds upon which it was issued are not proven.
Why It Matters
This opinion serves as a strong reminder of the high procedural and evidentiary standards required to maintain a pre-judgment writ of sequestration in Louisiana. It underscores that courts will not permit the seizure of a defendant’s property based on vague or unproven claims of an agreement. For attorneys, it highlights the critical importance of having clear, written fee-sharing and joint venture agreements, as informal “eat what you kill” arrangements or inconsistent past dealings will likely be insufficient to support the harsh remedy of sequestration.
The ruling also reinforces a strict procedural point: a defective writ cannot be “fixed” by the court once a motion to dissolve is filed. This prevents a plaintiff from using a flawed writ as a placeholder and then correcting it at the dissolution hearing. The case must now proceed on its underlying merits without the disputed funds being held by the court, placing both parties back on a level playing field for the remainder of the litigation.