Background
K.S. was born on June 15, 2023, testing positive for cocaine at birth. Days later, the 26th Judicial District Court for Webster Parish issued an instanter order removing K.S. and his older sibling from their mother’s custody, and the infant was placed in foster care — where he remained for the entirety of his early life. M.W., who was present at K.S.’s birth, never signed the birth certificate and never established paternity. The child’s mother, Ki.S., repeatedly told M.W. he was not the father, while simultaneously sending him photographs of the child. DCFS scheduled DNA testing for M.W. in San Antonio — near his home and at the state’s expense — in August and September 2023; he missed both appointments, citing work obligations, a grandmother’s death, and marital conflict with Ki.S.
DCFS made repeated attempts to contact M.W. by letter, phone, and text over the following two years, to no avail. M.W. participated in a July 2023 case plan meeting via Zoom but had no in-person contact with K.S. from shortly after birth until the state filed a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition in May 2025 — a gap of nearly two years. A third paternity test, completed in June 2025, confirmed M.W. as K.S.’s biological father. Only after receiving the TPR petition did M.W. begin visiting K.S., completing a parenting class, and engaging with DCFS. By that time, K.S. had spent his entire life with his foster family, who sought to adopt him.
Trial on the TPR petition was held September 22–24, 2025. The state dismissed its case-plan-compliance claims against M.W. but proceeded on abandonment. The trial court terminated M.W.’s parental rights on October 27, 2025, finding abandonment proven by clear and convincing evidence and concluding that termination served K.S.’s best interests. M.W. appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the biological-parent preference and his post-petition rehabilitation efforts.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Circuit affirmed. Applying the manifest-error standard, the court held that the state proved abandonment under La. Ch. C. art. 1015(4)(c) by clear and convincing evidence: M.W. failed to maintain any significant contact with K.S. — by visit or communication — for a period far exceeding the six consecutive months required by the statute. The court rejected M.W.’s contention that DCFS failed to diligently contact him, noting that the record documented repeated agency outreach by letter, phone, and text, and that M.W. himself acknowledged receiving court notices and speaking with DCFS workers. His participation in the July 2023 case-plan meeting further undercut his claim of ignorance.
The court also rejected M.W.’s reliance on Ki.S.’s paternity denials as justification for his prolonged absence. M.W. was present at K.S.’s birth, knew he might be the father, and had DNA testing arranged at his location and at no cost to him — yet he “decided not to” complete those tests for nearly two years, by his own admission. The court found that personal excuses including work travel, vehicle trouble, and a grandmother’s death did not relieve a parent of the primary duty to determine and discharge parental responsibility.
On best interests, the court found ample support for the trial court’s conclusion that K.S. — who had never lived with M.W. and regarded his foster family as his parents, siblings, and extended family — was best served by remaining in the stable, pre-adoptive placement he had known since birth. The court credited the trial court’s assessment that the single DCFS worker who personally favored placement with M.W. offered no objective analysis of the developmental risks of removing K.S. from his primary caregivers, and that the Court Appointed Special Advocates supported continued foster placement.
Key Takeaways
- A putative father’s reliance on the mother’s repeated denials of paternity does not excuse prolonged failure to establish parentage or maintain contact with a child in foster care.
- Under La. Ch. C. art. 1015(4)(c), failure to visit or communicate with a child for any six consecutive months constitutes abandonment; M.W.’s nearly two-year absence far exceeded that threshold.
- Post-petition rehabilitation efforts — completing parenting classes, visiting regularly, and engaging with DCFS — while relevant, do not automatically overcome a prior period of abandonment when the child’s developmental and attachment interests weigh against disruption.
- The child’s interest in a secure, permanent family placement is paramount and must ultimately prevail over the biological parent’s liberty interest in the parent-child relationship.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Louisiana courts will not hold a child’s permanency in abeyance while a biological parent slowly awakens to parental responsibility. The opinion makes clear that uncertainty about paternity — even when cultivated by a deceptive co-parent — does not suspend the clock on abandonment, particularly when DCFS arranges affordable, local testing and the parent repeatedly declines to act. Attorneys advising putative fathers in child-welfare matters should treat missed paternity appointments and prolonged disengagement as acute legal risks, regardless of what the mother tells their client.
The case also illustrates the weight Louisiana appellate courts place on a young child’s existing attachments during the critical early developmental window. Even where a biological father presents credible family support, completes a case plan rapidly, and has positive supervised visits, a toddler’s deep bond with pre-adoptive foster caregivers — established from near-birth — can tip the best-interest analysis decisively toward termination and adoption.