State v. Hicks — Court affirms felon-in-possession conviction and 20-year maximum sentence

Case
State of Louisiana v. Rodrick Raymond Hicks
Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit
Judge
PITMAN (elected 2012)
Date Decided
July 15, 2026
Docket No.
56,967-KA
Topics
Felon in possession of firearm; Waiver of right to testify; Criminal sentencing; Flight from trial
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

On May 14, 2024, Shreveport police responded to a complaint about juveniles with firearms at a residence on Dilg League Drive. When officers arrived, Rodrick Raymond Hicks answered the door and allowed them to enter. Officers observed marijuana canisters and a digital scale but could not conduct a full search without consent. After obtaining a search warrant, they discovered a Glock 19X firearm under the bedroom mattress, along with ammunition and magazines in a chest of drawers. Hicks admitted knowing about the firearm but claimed it was fake; officers determined it was functional. Critically, Hicks had been convicted in December 2016 of illegal use of a weapon, making him a convicted felon and his firearm possession a felony under La. R.S. 14:95.1.

Hicks was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Trial began on March 27, 2025. During a lunch recess, the trial court and defense counsel discussed conducting a colloquy about whether Hicks would testify. When court resumed at 1:00 p.m., Hicks was absent. Despite attempts to contact him, he did not return. The trial court, citing La. C. Cr. P. art. 832, proceeded with trial in Hicks’ absence and found he had waived his right to testify. A jury convicted him, and the trial court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The court noted that the firearm had been altered with a switch to make it fully automatic and that Hicks had prior felony convictions, fled the jurisdiction, and destroyed his ankle monitor.

The Court’s Holding

The Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed both conviction and sentence. On the right-to-testify issue, the court distinguished between the statutory right to be present at trial and the constitutional right to testify. Although a defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Louisiana Constitution, this right is not absolute and may yield to other legitimate trial interests. Because Hicks was present when the trial court and his counsel discussed the colloquy and then deliberately absented himself, he knew he was forfeiting his opportunity to testify. The court found no abuse of discretion: Hicks was not prevented from testifying, he voluntarily absconded, and his defense counsel remained present throughout, satisfying due process under La. C. Cr. P. arts. 831 and 832.

Regarding the excessive sentence claim, the court applied the two-prong test for sentencing review: whether the trial court complied with the La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 guidelines, and whether the sentence violates the Louisiana Constitution by being grossly out of proportion to the offense’s seriousness. The trial court properly analyzed the statutory sentencing factors, considered Hicks’ personal history and prior criminal record, and discussed offense severity. The court emphasized that maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and worst offenses. Given Hicks’ three prior felony convictions (including a prior weapons offense), the firearm’s alteration to fully automatic function, his willful flight and ankle monitor destruction, and the statutory range of 5 to 20 years, the court found the 20-year sentence constitutionally sound and within the trial court’s discretion.

Key Takeaways

  • A defendant who voluntarily absents himself from trial after learning of trial procedures waives his right to testify, even without a formal colloquy, if he knew he was forfeiting the opportunity.
  • La. C. Cr. P. art. 832 permits trial to proceed when a defendant initially present voluntarily absents himself after trial commences, provided defense counsel remains present throughout.
  • Trial courts have broad sentencing discretion within statutory limits; maximum sentences are appropriate when aggravating factors (prior felonies, weapon alteration, criminal history) are present.
  • In felon-in-possession cases, evidence of firearm modification and post-offense flight provide substantial grounds for maximum sentences despite the possessory nature of the offense.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies the boundaries between a defendant’s right to be present and his constitutional right to testify. While both are fundamental protections, the court holds that a defendant cannot weaponize voluntary absence to derail proceedings or create retrial grounds. By finding that Hicks waived his testify right through deliberate absence—without requiring a formal colloquy—the court prevents defendants from using flight as a tactical maneuver. This prioritizes judicial efficiency and orderly trial progress while respecting the defendant’s knowledge that he was forfeiting his opportunity.

For the broader criminal law community, the opinion reinforces judicial discretion in sentencing and the evidentiary weight of post-offense conduct. Trial courts may view flight from trial and destruction of monitoring devices as reflective of dangerousness and lack of rehabilitation, justifying maximum penalties. For prosecutors, firearm modification evidence can support maximum sentences in possessory offenses; for defense counsel, it underscores the critical importance of client presence and cooperation to avoid compounding legal jeopardy.

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