Background
Travis S. June was charged with molestation of a juvenile under 13 after Z.P., then 10, reported that her stepfather entered her bedroom, rubbed her feet while exposing and touching his penis, and offered her $5 not to tell anyone. A jury found June guilty of the responsive offense of attempted molestation of a juvenile under 13, and the trial court imposed 40 years at hard labor.
At trial, the state also introduced testimony about three prior sexual-offense reports involving June. The court rejected the jury’s initial verdict form, which said “attempted molestation of a juvenile,” as nonresponsive in form, and sent the jury a corrected form. The jury then unanimously returned a verdict of attempted molestation of a juvenile under 13.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The evidence, viewed in the state’s favor, allowed a rational jury to find that June committed lewd and lascivious acts with the intent to gratify sexual desire and used his position as Z.P.’s stepfather and household adult to exercise control over her. The court declined to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations.
The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar the corrected verdict because the original verdict was neither accepted nor recorded. And although the court did not decide whether admitting the prior-offense evidence violated the confrontation right or evidentiary rules, any error was harmless in light of the consistent and corroborated evidence concerning Z.P.’s account. The court vacated the sentence because the trial judge failed to specify the statutorily required restriction of benefits for at least 25 years, leaving a discretionary sentencing issue that could not be automatically corrected on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A jury’s unaccepted and unrecorded verdict does not trigger double-jeopardy protections.
- Any error in admitting the prior sexual-offense reports was harmless because the conviction was supported by other consistent evidence.
- For molestation of a juvenile under 13, the sentencing court must impose the statutory benefits restriction for at least 25 years.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that appellate courts may affirm a sex-offense conviction despite disputed other-crimes evidence when the remaining proof independently supports the verdict. It also underscores that a sentence must expressly comply with statutory restrictions when the trial court retains discretion over their duration.