Background
Eric Nabors was convicted of second-degree murder by a unanimous jury in April 2017 in connection with the death of a two-year-old child who was in his sole care. The conviction had a tortured procedural history: the trial court initially set aside the jury’s verdict and entered a judgment of acquittal for the lesser offense of negligent homicide, but the Second Circuit reversed that action in 2018 and reinstated the second-degree murder verdict. A subsequent defense motion for a new trial was also reversed by the appellate court. Nabors was ultimately sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without benefits in June 2019, and a direct appeal challenging the sentence as constitutionally excessive was rejected.
In June 2021, Nabors filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief, later amended through counsel to raise five claims. He ultimately focused on two: that he had been denied his right to waive a jury trial, and that his trial counsel had prevented him from testifying in his own defense. Evidentiary hearings were held in July 2024 and January 2025. Lead trial counsel testified that he routinely advises clients of their right to testify, that the decision rests solely with the client, and that his best recollection was that Nabors chose not to testify on his advice — partly because counsel feared Nabors would be a poor witness and might perjure himself. Second-chair counsel similarly testified he had no recollection of Nabors requesting to testify. Nabors himself testified that he repeatedly asked to take the stand but was rebuffed by counsel.
In March 2025, the trial court denied relief on the jury-waiver claim but granted a new trial on the right-to-testify claim, finding it was not clear from the record that Nabors had made an effective, knowing waiver of his right to testify. The state appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Circuit reversed the grant of post-conviction relief. Applying the two-part framework established by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Hampton, 818 So. 2d 720 (La. 2002), the court first noted that absent extraordinary circumstances alerting the trial court to a conflict between attorney and client, a defendant who does not attempt to take the stand is presumed to have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Because the trial record showed no objection by Nabors when his counsel announced the defense would rest, and no assertion of a desire to testify during the 40-minute recess before closing arguments, there were no extraordinary circumstances to trigger further inquiry by the trial court.
On the second Hampton factor, the court found that Nabors failed to meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of waiver. To overcome the presumption, a defendant must present specific facts — including a supporting affidavit from trial counsel — showing that counsel told the defendant he was legally forbidden to testify or otherwise compelled him to remain silent, and must demonstrate from the record that those allegations would be credible. Nabors offered only his own uncorroborated, self-serving testimony. Both of his trial attorneys contradicted his account, and the trial transcript contained no record of Nabors asserting a desire to testify or objecting to counsel’s decisions.
The court further cautioned that permitting uncorroborated, self-serving testimony alone to support post-conviction structural-error claims would undermine the finality of judgments, incentivize speculative claims, and burden the judicial system. Structural error claims, the court emphasized, demand a high evidentiary threshold precisely to preserve judicial stability and public confidence in final verdicts.
Key Takeaways
- Under State v. Hampton, a defendant who remains silent at trial and does not attempt to take the stand is presumed to have knowingly waived his right to testify; overcoming that presumption requires specific corroborated facts — not merely a defendant’s own testimony — showing counsel legally forbade or compelled the silence.
- A defendant’s uncorroborated, self-serving post-conviction testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of knowing waiver, particularly when both trial attorneys testify to the contrary and the trial transcript contains no indication of any conflict.
- Although denial of the right to testify is a structural error not subject to harmless error review, the heightened label does not lower the evidentiary bar for post-conviction claimants; if anything, structural error claims demand stricter corroboration to protect the finality of judgments.
- Trial courts should be cautious about granting new trials based solely on a defendant’s post-conviction assertion that counsel overrode his wish to testify, absent documentary or corroborating record support.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Louisiana’s demanding standard for post-conviction claims that trial counsel violated a defendant’s fundamental right to testify. By insisting on corroborating evidence — such as a supporting affidavit from trial counsel or contemporaneous record indicia of conflict — the Second Circuit draws a firm line against after-the-fact reconstructions of trial strategy by defendants facing life sentences. Defense attorneys handling post-conviction matters in Louisiana should be aware that a client’s own testimony, however detailed, will not suffice to carry the day without independent corroboration.
The opinion also highlights a recurring tension in criminal practice: the right to testify is personal and non-delegable, yet defendants routinely defer to counsel without making an on-the-record assertion. Courts applying Hampton will look for contemporaneous evidence of a client-counsel conflict rather than crediting a defendant’s later account that counsel simply would not listen. Practitioners on both sides should note that the absence of any on-record colloquy about a defendant’s testimonial choice — while not alone dispositive — significantly advantages the state when waiver is later disputed.