Background
R., a resident of a Cumberland County assisted living facility, has suffered multiple strokes and was diagnosed with moderate vascular dementia. The Cumberland County Probate Court appointed the Maine Department of Health and Human Services as his guardian in September 2022. In December 2024, R. filed a petition to terminate the guardianship, asserting he no longer required it. The Department responded by petitioning to be appointed his conservator, citing R.’s imminent inheritance of a substantial sum and his demonstrated vulnerability to financial exploitation—including his sending money to a woman he had never met whom he believed to be his girlfriend and heiress to $35 million.
The Probate Court consolidated both petitions and held a two-day hearing. The evidence showed that R. required assistance with daily living activities, lacked insight into his own cognitive limitations (he denied ever having had a stroke), had been hospitalized five times since 2023, and had a history of aggressive behavior toward staff. On these facts, the court denied the termination petition and granted the conservatorship petition, appointing the Department. R. timely appealed, arguing both that the evidentiary record was insufficient and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to obtain an independent psychological evaluation before the hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment in full. It held that clear and convincing evidence supported both the continuation of the guardianship and the establishment of a conservatorship. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the court held—for the first time in Maine—that individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship proceedings have a right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of those proceedings, flowing from the Legislature’s statutory guarantee of the right to appointed counsel. The court adopted the two-part Strickland v. Washington standard—deficient performance plus resulting prejudice—as the measure of effectiveness in this context, consistent with its prior application of that standard in termination-of-parental-rights and involuntary-commitment cases.
Applying Strickland, the court rejected R.’s ineffective-assistance claim on the prejudice prong. Assuming without deciding that counsel’s failure to secure an independent psychological evaluation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, the court found no prima facie showing that the omission affected the outcome: nothing in the record or briefing suggested an independent evaluation would have revealed anything other than serious cognitive deficits consistent with the evidence already presented by R.’s treating providers. The court also established the procedure for raising such claims going forward, requiring a supporting affidavit in all cases and, where the record requires supplementation, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion filed within one year of the expiration of the appeal deadline.
Key Takeaways
- Maine now expressly recognizes that adults subject to guardianship or conservatorship proceedings—including petitions to terminate existing arrangements—have a constitutional-quality right to the effective assistance of counsel, grounded in the statutory right to appointed counsel.
- Ineffective-assistance claims in these proceedings are evaluated under the two-prong Strickland standard: the individual must show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency actually affected the outcome.
- Claims whose basis is apparent from the record may be raised on direct appeal with a supporting affidavit; claims requiring factual development outside the record must be brought by a Rule 60(b)(6) motion filed within one year of the expiration of the time to appeal the underlying judgment.
- R.’s specific claim failed on prejudice: the record contained no indication that an independent psychological evaluation would have produced evidence favorable to him, given the extensive testimony from his own treating physicians documenting his cognitive deficits.
Why It Matters
This decision fills a significant gap in Maine guardianship law by formally guaranteeing the right to effective—not merely nominal—counsel to adults whose liberty and autonomy hang in the balance of these proceedings. Guardianship and conservatorship can strip an individual of the right to make decisions about where to live, how to manage finances, and how to care for oneself; the court analogizes these liberty stakes to those present in criminal and involuntary-commitment cases. Practitioners representing respondents in such proceedings now face a defined professional standard and clients have a recognized vehicle for redress when that standard is not met.
The procedural framework the court articulates—affidavit requirement, direct-appeal versus Rule 60(b)(6) pathway, and a one-year filing deadline—gives both counsel and probate courts clear guidance and avoids the open-ended litigation uncertainty that plagued earlier areas of law before analogous procedures were established. Defense attorneys, elder-law practitioners, and public defenders handling Maine guardianship matters should treat this decision as setting a new baseline for representation obligations.