Background
Diane Marchetti owns a condominium unit in Oak Hill Condominiums in Sagadahoc County, Maine, but does not live there. Her daughter, Caroline Thibeault, occupies the unit along with her son, who has a disability. In January 2025, the Oak Hill Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a foreclosure complaint against Marchetti, alleging she had defaulted on common charges and assessments, rule violation fines, and legal fees — the fines stemming in part from Thibeault’s alleged commercial use of the unit. Marchetti answered and raised affirmative defenses, including that Oak Hill failed to provide a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA).
In May 2025, Thibeault moved to intervene in the foreclosure action, both as of right under M.R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and permissively under Rule 24(b). She argued that as the unit’s occupant she had a direct interest in the litigation, that denial of intervention would impair her ability to assert claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and MHRA, and that Marchetti did not adequately represent her interests. The Superior Court summarily denied the motion, and Thibeault appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on all grounds, holding that Thibeault failed to satisfy any of the three prongs required for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). First, she lacked the requisite legal interest: the foreclosure action put Marchetti’s ownership rights at stake, not Thibeault’s possessory interest as an occupant or her statutory civil rights. Second, denial of intervention would not impair Thibeault’s ability to protect whatever interests she had — she had already filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, could assert a reasonable accommodation defense in any subsequent eviction proceeding, and had already contributed an affidavit to Marchetti’s opposition to summary judgment. Third, Marchetti adequately represented Thibeault’s interests because both shared the same objective — defeating the foreclosure — and Marchetti was actively asserting the same disability-accommodation defenses Thibeault sought to raise.
The court also affirmed denial of permissive intervention. Although Thibeault’s proposed defenses presented common questions of law and fact with the main action, adding her as a party would unduly delay proceedings already at the summary judgment stage. The court found her contemplated efforts largely duplicative of what Marchetti had already advanced, including submission of Thibeault’s own lengthy affidavit.
Key Takeaways
- An occupant of a condominium unit — even one with disability-related housing claims — does not automatically have a legally protectable “interest” for purposes of intervention as of right in a foreclosure action against the unit’s owner; the core interest at stake in foreclosure is ownership, not occupancy.
- Alternative avenues for relief (administrative complaints, defenses in future eviction proceedings, testimony in the existing action) can defeat the “impairment” prong of Rule 24(a)(2) even where intervention is denied.
- Where a proposed intervenor and an existing party share the same litigation objective and assert the same defenses, the existing party’s representation is presumed adequate under Rule 24(a)(2).
- Permissive intervention may be denied even when common questions of law or fact exist, if joining the new party would unduly delay proceedings already advanced and the proposed defenses are substantially duplicated by an existing party.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the boundaries of intervention rights in Maine condominium foreclosure proceedings, particularly where occupants — rather than record owners — assert fair housing and disability accommodation defenses. Attorneys representing condominium associations can cite the case to resist intervention efforts by third-party occupants, while counsel for occupants should understand that civil rights claims may need to be pursued through administrative channels or in separate proceedings rather than by grafting onto a foreclosure action.
The decision also reinforces a practical point about the adequacy-of-representation prong: active collaboration between a proposed intervenor and an existing party — including sharing affidavits and strategy — can undercut the argument that the intervenor’s interests are unrepresented, potentially foreclosing intervention even where the intervenor might otherwise have colorable claims.