Background
Darby Sabin alleged that her grandfather, Steven Sabin, executed a will under which she would receive the share of his estate that would have passed to her predeceased father. Steven also granted his stepson, Shawn Newcomb, broad authority under a financial power of attorney, including authority to transfer property and make gifts.
According to the complaint, Shawn sold Steven’s home to Cynthia Soucy’s son, Owen Soucy, for $105,000 despite listing it for $225,000, then deposited the proceeds into an account jointly owned by Shawn, Cynthia, and Steven. The complaint alleged that this arrangement caused the funds to pass to Shawn and Cynthia rather than through Steven’s estate. Darby sued Shawn, Cynthia, and Owen for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance and sought remedies including a constructive trust and punitive damages. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The Court’s Holding
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal as to all counts. Applying Maine’s notice-pleading standard, the court held that Darby adequately alleged the source and nature of her expected inheritance by identifying herself as Steven’s grandchild and a beneficiary under his will and by describing property allegedly diverted from the estate. The court explained that precedent requiring proof of the source, nature, and extent of an expectancy addresses the evidence needed later in the case, not the detail required in a complaint.
The court also held that an inheritance expectancy need not be irrevocable and that lifetime transfers can support the tort when wrongful interference prevents property from passing as expected. Although the power of attorney gave Shawn broad authority and substantial protection from liability, it could not exonerate dishonest conduct, conduct undertaken with an improper motive, or reckless indifference to the power’s purposes. Allegations that Shawn orchestrated a below-market sale, used a joint account to keep the proceeds outside the estate, and excluded Darby from payable-on-death accounts sufficiently alleged bad faith.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff pleading tortious interference with an expected inheritance need only provide fair notice of the expectancy and the alleged interference; detailed proof of its value and extent may be developed later.
- A lifetime transfer may support the claim even though the testator remained free to change an estate plan, because the tort protects an expectation rather than a guaranteed inheritance.
- A broadly drafted power of attorney cannot shield an agent from liability for dishonest acts, improper motives, or reckless indifference to the power’s purposes.
Why It Matters
The decision separates pleading requirements from the evidentiary burden imposed at trial. Maine plaintiffs need not prove the precise size of an expected inheritance in their complaints when they identify the testamentary source of the expectancy and describe how defendants allegedly diverted estate property.
The ruling also underscores a statutory limit on exoneration clauses in powers of attorney: extensive authority to transfer or gift a principal’s assets is not immunity for alleged bad-faith self-dealing. The case returns to the Superior Court for further proceedings, where Darby must substantiate her allegations with evidence.