Background
On July 28, 2024, a Kennebec County deputy responded to a domestic dispute involving Steven Truman and his girlfriend, A.D., observing marks on A.D.’s neck and face consistent with assault. Truman was arrested for domestic violence aggravated assault and transported to the county jail, where cash bail was set with a no-contact condition as to A.D. Truman signed a form acknowledging the no-contact order but, while still in custody that same day, called A.D. by phone. In the recorded call, he urged her to “play it off” and suggested her injuries could be attributed to roughhousing with children.
A grand jury subsequently indicted Truman on a second docket for victim tampering (Class B), improper victim contact pre-bail (Class D), and violation of a condition of release (Class C). Critically, the State dismissed the original domestic violence assault charges against Truman several weeks before his tampering trial commenced. Truman moved to preclude use of documents identifying A.D. as a victim, arguing that because the underlying assault charges were gone, the State could not prove A.D. was an “actual victim” as required by the tampering statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-B)(A)(1). The trial court rejected this argument, and the jury convicted Truman on both remaining counts.
Truman appealed on four grounds: (1) the trial court’s interpretation of “victim” in the tampering statute; (2) the admission of the jail call recordings; (3) the denial of in camera review of the victim witness advocate’s records; and (4) alleged burden-shifting during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction on all grounds.
The Court’s Holding
On the central statutory question, the court held that 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-B) does not require the State to prove the elements of the underlying offense — or that the defendant was actually guilty of that offense — in order to establish that the object of the tampering was a “victim.” Reading the statute according to its plain text, the court noted that the tampering offense applies even where a defendant only believes that an official proceeding will be instituted, meaning the term “victim” necessarily encompasses a person believed by the accused to have been harmed, even before charges are filed or if they are later dismissed. The court further grounded this reading in 1989 legislative history, which expressly defined “victim” for tampering purposes as “the person named in the charging instrument as the object of the criminal conduct or a person who suffered the consequences or result of the prohibited acts.” Truman’s contrary reading, the court observed, would create a perverse incentive: defendants could tamper with victims to undermine the State’s underlying case and thereby also shield themselves from tampering liability.
On the evidentiary issues, the court upheld the admission of the jail call recordings, finding the District Attorney’s investigator was a “witness with knowledge” under M.R. Evid. 901(b)(1) who established the same foundational facts approved in State v. Coston, 2019 ME 141 — offsite server storage, unique inmate PINs, password-protected access, and no alteration of the recordings. The court also rejected the hearsay objections, noting Truman’s own statements were not offered for their truth and constituted admissions by an opposing party under M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
The court found no prejudicial error in the denial of in camera review of the victim witness advocate’s records. The State had already disclosed the key exculpatory material — including A.D.’s statement that “nothing happened” — through the jail call recordings and trial testimony. Truman’s assertion that further undisclosed exculpatory material must exist was speculative, and speculation alone cannot override the strong statutory privilege protecting victim-advocate communications. On the burden-shifting claim, the trial court gave a comprehensive curative instruction after the challenged prosecutorial statement, and Truman raised no further objection after that instruction was given.
Key Takeaways
- Under Maine’s victim tampering statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-B), the State need not prove the defendant committed the underlying crime. “Victim” means the person named as the object of criminal conduct in the charging instrument or investigation — dismissal of the underlying charge does not retroactively eliminate victim status for tampering purposes.
- Jail call recordings may be authenticated under M.R. Evid. 901(b)(1) by a DA investigator with routine knowledge of the recording system, even if that witness is not a jail employee or the system’s developer. The authentication standard is flexible and imposes a low burden of proof.
- A defendant seeking in camera review of privileged victim-advocate records must offer more than speculation; where the State has already disclosed the substance of potentially exculpatory communications, residual concerns about additional hidden material will not overcome the statutory privilege.
- A prosecutorial comment that can be read as burden-shifting is curable by a prompt, thorough jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof; where defense counsel accepts the curative instruction without further objection, the issue is not preserved for relief on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a significant gap in Maine’s victim tampering law, making clear that a defendant cannot defeat a tampering charge by successfully unraveling — or waiting for the State to dismiss — the underlying offense. The ruling closes what would have been a dangerous loophole: under Truman’s proposed rule, the most effective way to avoid tampering liability would be to tamper so successfully that the underlying prosecution collapses. By anchoring “victim” status to the charging instrument and the defendant’s own belief at the time of the tampering conduct, the court aligns the statute with its core purpose of protecting crime victims from intimidation and preserving the integrity of investigations before, and independent of, a formal conviction.
The decision also provides practical guidance on two recurring evidentiary issues in domestic violence prosecutions: the admissibility of jail call recordings authenticated by law enforcement investigators rather than jail personnel, and the threshold showing required before courts must conduct in camera review of the increasingly common victim-advocate privilege. Prosecutors and defense attorneys in Maine can expect both holdings to be cited frequently in pretrial litigation in cases involving recorded inmate communications and requests to pierce advocate confidentiality.