Background
Two sisters, Elham and Eman Amini-Nejad, sued their sister, Ellahe Amini-Nejad, after their father’s will and irrevocable trust named Ellahe as the sole beneficiary of his U.S.-based assets. The sisters alleged that Ellahe wrongfully interfered with their expected inheritance, including by procuring estate-planning documents their father allegedly did not understand and by handling his trust assets for her own benefit.
Following a four-day jury trial in the Circuit Court for Howard County, the jury found that the sisters reasonably expected to receive an inheritance. It nevertheless found that Ellahe had not intentionally interfered with that expectation through wrongful conduct. The trial court had instructed the jury that the sisters had to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The sisters appealed, challenging that instruction as well as evidentiary rulings concerning the drafting attorney’s remote deposition and a handwriting expert.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Court of Maryland held that intentional interference with an expected inheritance must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court of Maryland recognized the tort in Barclay v. Castruccio as a species of interference with economic expectancy, and the appellate court concluded that the ordinary civil burden therefore applies.
The erroneous instruction imposed a higher burden than Maryland law requires. On this record, the court could not determine that the error was harmless or that the jury would have reached the same verdict under the correct standard. It therefore reversed the Howard County judgment. Because the case must be retried, the court did not decide the challenges to the admission of the drafting attorney’s de bene esse deposition or exclusion of the handwriting expert.
Key Takeaways
- A Maryland claim for intentional interference with an expected inheritance is governed by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
- Clear and convincing evidence is not required merely because the alleged wrongful conduct includes fraud-like allegations.
- Giving a jury an improperly heightened burden of proof is reversible when the appellate court cannot rule out probable prejudice.
Why It Matters
This is the first Maryland appellate decision to specify the burden of proof for the inheritance-interference tort recognized in Barclay. Plaintiffs need only establish the tort’s elements as more likely true than not, even when their theory includes alleged misconduct associated with fraud, undue influence, or estate-planning documents.
The decision also underscores that courts must separately identify the claim actually submitted to the jury. Applying a heightened standard applicable to a different cause of action can require a new trial when the evidentiary dispute is contested.