Background
Sam Duraiswamy, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India and a retired Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer, died intestate in November 2021 at his home in Gaithersburg, Maryland, leaving an estate valued at over $2.7 million. His long-term companion, Diane Adams, died eight days later at the same residence. The two had never formally married. Kevin McCarthy, appointed personal representative of the Duraiswamy Estate, was unable to locate blood relatives in India and moved to distribute the estate to the Montgomery County Board of Education under Maryland’s escheat statute. He also sought court guidance on whether to recognize the Adams Estate as an heir.
The Estate of Diane Adams asserted that she and Decedent had entered into a common-law marriage in Washington, D.C., where common-law marriage is recognized. At a September 2023 evidentiary hearing before the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County, the Adams Estate presented testimony from Diane’s first cousin and estate representative, Dominick Adams (D.K. Adams), and his wife Sara Adams (S. Adams). Their testimony described decades of cohabitation, shared finances, and two out-of-court statements — one in which Decedent referred to D.E. Adams as “my wife” at a car dealership, and another in which D.E. Adams told bridal-shower guests she had been married for 35 years.
Between hearings, Decedent’s blood heirs — a nephew and two nieces living in India — were identified. The orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent them and allowed their participation at an August 2024 hearing, over the Adams Estate’s objection. The court ultimately excluded the two out-of-court statements under Maryland’s Dead Man’s Statute and the hospital admission form as hearsay, then granted judgment for the Blood Heirs, finding the evidence legally insufficient to establish a common-law marriage. The Adams Estate appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed on all issues. First, the court held that the Adams Estate’s challenges to the Board of Education’s continued participation and the appointment of Blood Heirs’ counsel were unpreserved, because no objection was raised at the February or August 2024 hearings when those decisions were made. Second, the court found no abuse of discretion in permitting the Blood Heirs to present evidence and argument at the August 2024 hearing: because they had only been identified after the September 2023 evidentiary proceeding, they could not have participated earlier, their interests were antagonistic to those of the Adams Estate, and the Adams Estate was given an opportunity to respond by recalling D.K. Adams.
On the evidentiary rulings, the court held that the hospital Patient Information Sheet — which listed Decedent’s marital status as “Married” and identified D.E. Adams as his emergency contact — was properly excluded as hearsay because those entries were not “pathologically germane” to Decedent’s diagnosis or treatment, and thus did not qualify under the business-records exception as applied to medical records. As to the Car Dealership Statement, the court held that D.K. Adams was barred by the Dead Man’s Statute (CJP § 9-116) from testifying about Decedent’s words, because as personal representative of the Adams Estate and a potential distributee of that estate, he had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome. The court distinguished its earlier decision in Zadnik v. Ambinder, where the statute did not apply because the wrongful-death claim did not affect the decedent’s estate.
Regarding the Bridal Shower Statement attributed to D.E. Adams, the court held that S. Adams — as the spouse of an interested party, but not herself a party with a pecuniary or proprietary interest — was not subject to the Dead Man’s Statute. Any error in excluding her testimony was, however, harmless: the orphans’ court, as finder of fact, was entitled to assess weight and credibility of the evidence, and its state of “honest doubt” about the existence of a common-law marriage was supported by the record — including deeds showing Decedent consistently identified himself as unmarried and a death certificate listing his status as “Never Married,” with D.K. Adams identified only as “Friend.”
Key Takeaways
- A trial court has broad discretion to reopen an evidentiary record before closing arguments to accommodate a newly identified party whose interests were not previously represented; the opposing party’s opportunity to respond defeats any claim of unfair prejudice.
- Under Maryland’s Dead Man’s Statute (CJP § 9-116), a personal representative who is also a potential distributee of the claiming estate is an “interested party” barred from testifying about statements made by the decedent.
- The spouse of an interested party is not herself barred by the Dead Man’s Statute merely by virtue of the marital relationship; a direct pecuniary or proprietary stake is required.
- Hospital admission records showing marital status and emergency-contact designations are not admissible under the business-records exception to hearsay because they are not “pathologically germane” to a patient’s diagnosis or treatment.
- Appellate challenges to procedural rulings (Board participation, counsel appointment) are waived if no contemporaneous objection was lodged at the relevant hearing.
Why It Matters
This decision provides a practical roadmap for Maryland estate litigation involving alleged common-law marriages formed in other jurisdictions. Practitioners must carefully evaluate which witnesses are “interested parties” under the Dead Man’s Statute — a status that turns on pecuniary stake, not merely family connection — and should not assume that hospital demographic data will carry the evidentiary weight of a formal marital record. The distinction drawn between D.K. Adams (barred) and S. Adams (not barred) also signals that litigants can structure witness strategy around the statute’s limits.
The opinion also reinforces that orphans’ courts retain significant flexibility to adapt proceedings as new parties emerge, particularly in intestate estates where the universe of heirs is initially unknown. For estates with potential international heirs, this case illustrates both the procedural complexity that arises when heirs are located mid-litigation and the need to preserve all objections contemporaneously to avoid waiver on appeal.