Background
In 2018, Michael and Sharon Greany purchased a home in Westfield, Massachusetts, adjacent to a property owned by Richard Tersavich. The only way to reach either home was over a private driveway located entirely on Tersavich’s property, and the Greanys’ deed included an express easement for “vehicle or otherwise” access over that driveway. A Shared Maintenance Agreement recorded in the Hampden Registry of Deeds in 1990 also bound both properties to equal responsibility for reasonable and necessary driveway upkeep.
The neighbor relationship deteriorated. In 2020, following a dispute that led to police involvement, Tersavich installed surveillance cameras along the driveway—at one point numbering thirteen, with at least four pointed directly at the driveway. He also posted hostile signs along the way. The Greanys testified that the constant camera surveillance made them so uncomfortable that they began limiting their driveway use; they also requested a change in their child’s bus stop to avoid the child being recorded. In the spring of 2021, Tersavich installed four speed bumps approximately fifty feet apart along the flat section of the driveway. Although Joanne Tersavich characterized the bumps as a safety measure, Tersavich himself acknowledged at trial that one purpose was to “minimize the amount of cars going up and down.” The Greanys could not drive their Corvette over the bumps without risking damage, as the spikes sometimes protruded from the bumps.
In May 2022, the Greanys filed suit in the Land Court seeking removal of the cameras and speed bumps as a material interference with their easement. After a view of the property and a trial in May 2024, the Land Court judge found that the cameras were installed to intimidate rather than for security, and that the speed bumps were designed to deter easement use. The judge ordered removal of all driveway-facing cameras and all speed bumps, and rejected Tersavich’s counterclaim for reimbursement of water pipe repair costs. Tersavich appealed.
The Court’s Holding
A panel of Rubin, Desmond, and Allen, JJ., affirmed in full. As the owner of the servient estate, Tersavich was entitled to use his property so long as he did not “materially interfere” with the Greanys’ easement rights as the dominant estate. See Highland Club of W. Roxbury v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 327 Mass. 711, 714–715 (1951). The question under Massachusetts law is not whether the interference is physical or total, but “whether the interference is so slight as to be reasonable in all the circumstances.” Yagjian v. O’Brien, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 735 (1985).
On the cameras, the court rejected the argument that the absence of physical blockage precluded a finding of material interference. The trial judge’s findings—that Tersavich installed the cameras not for security but to intimidate the Greanys into using the driveway less—were supported by the record, including Tersavich’s own hostile signs and the pattern of conduct. Where the Greanys actually limited their driveway use and rerouted their child’s bus stop as a direct result of the surveillance, the requisite material interference with their right to use the easement was established. See Texon, Inc. v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 363, 366 (1979); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 740, 742–745, 753 (2002). The court also dismissed Tersavich’s argument that the trial judge had improperly adjudicated a statutory invasion-of-privacy claim: the judge’s reference to an “unjustified invasion of the Greanys’ privacy” was a characterization of the camera conduct as intimidating—not a ruling on any standalone G. L. c. 214, § 1B claim. The remedy was appropriately tailored, covering only cameras facing the driveway or the Greanys’ property and leaving intact any cameras directed solely at Tersavich’s own property.
On the speed bumps, the court again deferred to the trial judge’s credibility and factual findings. Tersavich’s own testimony that the bumps were partly intended to minimize traffic established an impermissible purpose, and the uncontested evidence that the Greanys could not safely traverse them in their vehicle showed actual interference. On the counterclaim for reimbursement of water pipe repairs, the court found both that Tersavich had waived the issue by advancing no legal argument on appeal, and that the record was insufficient to establish the cost as “reasonable and necessary” under the Shared Maintenance Agreement.
Key Takeaways
- Under Massachusetts easement law, material interference with a dominant estate’s easement rights does not require physical obstruction; it includes conduct that chills or deters the dominant estate owner’s exercise of those rights.
- Surveillance cameras installed by a servient estate owner with the purpose of intimidating easement users—evidenced by hostile conduct and the dominant estate’s actual reduction in driveway use—can constitute material interference warranting injunctive removal.
- Speed bumps installed to minimize the dominant estate’s traffic (rather than for genuine safety) are subject to removal as material interference, particularly where they physically prevent the dominant estate owner’s vehicles from safely traversing the driveway.
- A servient owner’s stated purpose matters: Tersavich’s own acknowledgment that the speed bumps were to “minimize” traffic was central to the court’s affirmance. Candid testimony by the servient owner about intent can be decisive evidence of material interference.
- A trial judge’s reference to a “privacy invasion” in the easement context does not transform the claim into a G. L. c. 214, § 1B tort action; the label does not determine the cause of action when the findings address easement interference.
Why It Matters
This decision is useful for Massachusetts property litigators handling servient-estate disputes where the interference is behavioral rather than structural. Courts have long recognized that easement holders are entitled to more than mere physical access—they are entitled to use the way without the “inconvenience” of conduct designed to make that use uncomfortable or unwelcome. Greany v. Tersavich confirms that modern surveillance technology is not exempt from that principle: a camera system deployed to watch and deter—not to secure—is as actionable as a locked gate.
For counsel representing dominant estate holders, the case underscores the importance of documenting the chilling effect of the servient owner’s conduct: changes in behavior, reduced use of the way, efforts to avoid the surveillance. That evidence of changed conduct was pivotal here. For counsel representing servient estate owners, the decision is a caution against stating in testimony that the purpose of physical installations was to limit the dominant estate’s traffic—and against posting signs that corroborate a hostile rather than protective intent. This is an unpublished Rule 23.0 summary decision, citable for persuasive value under Mass. R. A. P. 1:28 and its successor.