Background
M.L. is an eighty-five-year-old man diagnosed with progressive dementia, type 2 diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol who had resided with his son John and wife Maria in Fall River. In September 2023, Hortensia, M.L.’s adult daughter and a registered nurse, filed petitions in the Probate and Family Court seeking appointment as M.L.’s general guardian and conservator. She had discovered that John had not taken M.L. to medical appointments for years, had written to M.L.’s insurance carrier directing that his prescriptions be cancelled and future appointments not be scheduled, had shifted M.L. to a vegan diet causing him to drop to 105 pounds, and had refused access for a home health aide. M.L. had also been found wandering up to a mile from home without supervision. John and Maria filed competing petitions seeking their own appointment.
Following a one-day trial in November 2024—which Maria did not attend—the Probate and Family Court found Hortensia to be “a devoted and caring daughter and a suitable and appropriate caretaker” for M.L. and appointed her as sole guardian and conservator. The judge dismissed John’s and Maria’s petitions. John appealed, arguing that Hortensia was not qualified; that Maria, as M.L.’s spouse, had statutory priority; and that he himself had priority as a beneficiary named in his parents’ real estate trust.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed. The Massachusetts Appeals Court (Meade, Hodgens & Allen, JJ.) rejected all of John’s arguments. On suitability, the court found no abuse of discretion: the trial judge’s exhaustive findings documented John’s years of medical neglect, his active interference with Hortensia’s temporary guardianship, and the measurable improvement in M.L.’s health and safety once Hortensia assumed care. Under the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC), G. L. c. 190B, § 5-305(d), the court “acting in the best interest of the incapacitated person, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority or no priority.” Ample evidence supported that determination here.
On Maria’s spousal priority, the court noted three dispositive problems: Maria’s objection to Hortensia’s petition was not in the appellate record and could not be evaluated; Maria never filed her own petition or assented to John’s; and Maria did not appear at trial, depriving the judge of any basis to assess her suitability as the statute requires. See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-305(c)(1). Priority is not self-executing—a person asserting it must actually participate in the proceeding. On John’s trust argument, the court held that being named as a beneficiary in a real estate trust is not a “nomination of guardian” under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-301(b), and in any event the trust instrument was never entered in evidence at trial.
Key Takeaways
- Under MUPC § 5-305(d), a probate judge may pass over a person with higher priority—including a spouse—and appoint a lower-priority or non-priority person if doing so is in the incapacitated person’s best interests. Suitability is not presumed from kinship or status.
- A spouse asserting statutory priority under § 5-305(c)(1) must actually appear and participate in the guardianship proceeding. Failure to file a petition, assent to another’s petition, or appear at trial forfeits any priority argument on appeal.
- Beneficiary status in a trust is not equivalent to a nomination of guardian under § 5-301(b), which requires a formal designation. And evidence not admitted at trial cannot be relied upon on appeal.
- A guardian’s conduct during a temporary appointment—here, John’s interference with Hortensia’s temporary guardianship and cancellation of medical appointments—is relevant and admissible at the permanent-appointment hearing to assess suitability.
- Guardianship proceedings are designed to effectuate the best interests of the incapacitated person, not to adjudicate competing family members’ interests. Guardianship of B.V.G., 474 Mass. 315, 321 (2016).
Why It Matters
For Massachusetts probate and elder-law practitioners, Guardianship of M.L. is a useful illustration of how the MUPC’s statutory priority hierarchy operates in practice when the highest-priority candidate is unsuitable. The case makes clear that spousal priority under § 5-305(c)(1) is not automatic: a spouse who fails to participate in the proceeding cannot later complain on appeal that the court should have appointed her. Counsel advising a client who wishes to contest a guardianship petition should ensure that client appears, files the appropriate petition or assent, and testifies—absence at trial is almost impossible to remedy on appeal.
The case also highlights the importance of the temporary-guardianship phase. The conduct of potential guardians during temporary appointments goes directly to suitability at the permanent hearing—John’s documented interference with medical care, prescription-filling, and home health aide access proved decisive. Practitioners advising temporary guardians should counsel them to cooperate fully and document their efforts; those advising competing family members should counsel them not to obstruct. In a closely contested case, a few months of documented conduct can determine the outcome.