Background
The parties share a child and have a history of custody litigation. The dispute giving rise to the personal protection order (PPO) began when the child was in the father’s (petitioner’s) care and the mother (respondent) made repeated calls and messages seeking contact with the child. The situation escalated when the mother posted a video on social media that included a screenshot of the parties’ messages along with the father’s cell phone number. The father then received threatening messages from an unknown number warning that his information was “going viral” and that his address would be leaked. The mother also made multiple calls to law enforcement requesting welfare checks at the father’s home, which officers eventually declined to conduct given the excessive and unfounded nature of the calls.
The father sought an ex parte PPO against the mother under MCL 600.2950, which was granted without a hearing. The mother delayed a scheduled transfer of the child and continued contacting law enforcement. At a subsequent custody hearing, the trial court suspended the mother’s parenting time, reviewed police reports documenting her excessive reporting, and instructed her to stop calling police. The court confirmed the PPO remained in effect and served the mother with it in open court after she claimed she had never received notice.
The mother moved to terminate the PPO. The trial court denied that motion, and the mother appealed, challenging both the propriety of the PPO’s issuance and its alleged violation of her due process and First Amendment rights.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of the PPO and its denial of the mother’s motion to terminate it. The court first addressed mootness, noting that the PPO had expired on September 3, 2025, but held the appeal was not moot because the mother sought removal of the PPO from the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)—a recognized exception to mootness under TM v MZ, 501 Mich 312 (2018). On the merits, the court found reasonable cause existed under MCL 600.2950 to believe the mother had committed and would continue to commit stalking under MCL 750.411h, given her repeated unwanted electronic contact after being asked to stop, her public posting of the father’s phone number, and her pattern of calling police with unfounded welfare-check requests. The court rejected the mother’s argument that her conduct amounted to lawful parental communication, finding it excessive and without legitimate purpose.
The court also rejected the mother’s constitutional arguments. On due process, it held that the ex parte PPO was properly issued based on affidavits demonstrating exigent circumstances, and that the mother was subsequently served, moved to terminate the order, and received a hearing—satisfying procedural due process requirements under Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377 (1999). The court found her misreading of MCR 3.705(B)(1) did not support her notice argument, as that rule’s hearing-scheduling provision is inapplicable when a petitioner requests an ex parte order.
On the First Amendment claim, the court held that the PPO did not violate the mother’s free speech rights. Citing ARM v KJL, 342 Mich App 283 (2022), the court explained that the PPO restricted the mother’s contact with the father rather than the content of any speech, and that the right to speak freely must be balanced against another person’s interest in being left alone.
Key Takeaways
- A PPO based on stalking under MCL 750.411h can be supported by a pattern of excessive electronic contact and repeated unfounded police welfare-check calls, even when the respondent characterizes her conduct as legitimate parental communication.
- An expired PPO appeal is not moot where the respondent seeks removal of the PPO record from LEIN, preserving a live controversy over whether the order was properly issued.
- An ex parte PPO does not violate due process so long as the petition is supported by affidavits showing exigent circumstances and the respondent subsequently receives notice and an opportunity to be heard.
- A PPO that restricts contact rather than the content of speech does not violate the First Amendment, as free speech rights must yield to another person’s interest in being left alone.
- The court warned that briefs citing authority that does not support the stated propositions may result in disciplinary action in future proceedings.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that courts may issue PPOs in co-parenting disputes when one party’s conduct crosses from legitimate parental communication into stalking-adjacent harassment—including posting the other parent’s personal information online and weaponizing law enforcement through repeated unfounded welfare checks. It signals that labeling intrusive conduct as “parental contact” will not insulate a party from a PPO when the volume and nature of that contact causes reasonable fear or distress.
The opinion also carries a notable procedural warning: the court identified multiple instances where the self-represented mother cited cases, statutes, and court rules for propositions they do not support, and it issued an explicit caution—applicable to represented and pro se parties alike—that filings containing overt and excessive citation errors may result in sanctions or disciplinary action in the future.