Background
Gregg and Scott Ecker, beneficiaries of the Mark L. Ecker Trust created in 2010, challenged their sister Karen Nickel’s administration of the trust following their father Mark’s death in 2019. The trust named Nickel as successor trustee. After Mark died, the Eckers became concerned about Nickel’s refusals to provide accounting information and the validity of a purported “First Amendment” to the trust that would have eliminated Gregg’s reduced distribution share—a reduction that the original trust imposed because of lifetime gifts their parents made to him.
The First Amendment was never signed by Mark. Instead, Nickel asserted that Mark had directed his attorney to draft it, but offered no independent evidence. The signature lines referenced an attached document that Nickel and co-defendant Kim Martinchek created months after Mark’s death, in which they recorded their beliefs about Mark’s wishes. Additionally, the Eckers alleged that Nickel improperly occupied the family home owned by the trust without paying rent, contrary to the trust’s requirement that the property be held for the benefit of all siblings.
The Eckers filed a civil action seeking Nickel’s removal as trustee, a declaration that the First Amendment was invalid, and an accounting of trust assets. Nickel defaulted without responding, explaining later that she hoped to settle the dispute out of court. The probate court removed Nickel as trustee, declared the First Amendment invalid, required an inventory and accounting, and later ordered Nickel to pay fair market value rent retroactively.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed in full. The threshold issue involved a procedural defect: the Eckers filed their complaint as a “civil action” rather than as a “proceeding” as required for trust administration matters under Michigan law. The court held this was a procedural error, not a jurisdictional one. Because the case proceeded as a civil action, an earlier order removing Nickel was not immediately appealable of right, permitting appellate review in this later appeal from the final judgment. The probate court retained subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of the improper form.
On the merits, the court affirmed Nickel’s removal. Her default admitted the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint—that she failed to provide required accountings and inventories, attempted to amend the trust without authority, and refused requests for information. These admissions established violations of fiduciary duties under Michigan law, constituting either “a serious breach of trust” or “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure” to administer the trust effectively. The court also upheld the invalidation of the First Amendment: the trust’s written terms controlled, not the trustee’s assertions about the settlor’s unstated wishes, and an unsigned document created after Mark’s death could not amend an irrevocable trust.
Regarding Nickel’s claims for compensation, the court affirmed that the probate court properly denied or reduced them. Nickel bore the burden of proving her claims for caregiving and legal services but provided no documentation, kept no records, and offered no expert testimony. Her credibility was also questioned by the trial court. On the rent issue, the court affirmed that occupancy of the family property during Mark’s lifetime did not authorize continued rent-free occupancy after his death; the trust required the property be held for the benefit of all siblings and use to be determined by majority vote.
Key Takeaways
- A trust proceeding filed incorrectly as a civil action is a procedural error, not a jurisdictional defect, and does not deprive the probate court of authority to hear trust administration disputes.
- A trustee’s default operates as admission of well-pleaded factual allegations establishing fiduciary breaches, providing adequate grounds for removal under MCL 700.7706(2).
- An unsigned amendment to a trust created after the settlor’s death, supported only by the trustee’s assertions about the settlor’s unstated wishes, cannot override the trust’s written terms.
- A trustee claiming compensation for personal services bears the burden of documenting those services with records, logs, or expert testimony; undocumented claims may be denied or reduced based on inadequate proof.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms fundamental trust law principles while clarifying procedural rules for probate practice. The court held firm that trust documents control interpretation—a trustee cannot unilaterally modify a trust based on perceived intent, even when claiming to honor the settlor’s wishes. The ruling is significant for trustees facing removal actions: a default resulting from failure to respond to notice, coupled with admitted breaches of fiduciary duties, provides ample statutory basis for removal without requiring additional factual findings. Trustee compensation claims require documentation; oral or unsupported testimony will not suffice.
The procedural holding—that improper form of action does not strip the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction—benefits probate litigation by allowing courts to reach the merits despite technical pleading errors. For practitioners, the opinion underscores that a trustee’s duties are strictly construed and failure to provide information, keep records, or account for assets violates enforceable statutory obligations (MCL 700.7811 and 700.7814). The court’s treatment of the unsigned amendment also clarifies that post-death documents cannot substitute for the settlor’s actual signature or demonstrated intent memorialized in writing during the settlor’s lifetime.