Background
Michele Lynn Hembree owned a home in West Bloomfield Township and had received a principal residence exemption from certain property taxes. She alleged that parks commission officials Robert Brooks and Jennifer Tucker told township assessor Robert Scripture that she lived in Detroit rather than in the township. Although Scripture initially accepted her driver’s license as proof of residency, Hembree alleged that he later reported her supposed nonresidency to the Michigan Department of Treasury, resulting in denial of the exemption and a notice that her home was at risk of tax foreclosure.
Hembree sued the Oakland County Treasurer, the township, Brooks, Tucker, and Scripture, asserting invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, and claims labeled as equitable estoppel, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The circuit court granted summary disposition to all defendants. It allowed Hembree 14 days to amend her complaint to allege gross negligence against Brooks and Tucker, but she missed the deadline; the court then closed the case and denied her later motions for reconsideration, leave to amend, and relief from judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to determine Hembree’s residency for purposes of establishing entitlement to a principal residence exemption. Review of a denial affecting property-tax liability falls within the Michigan Tax Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction, and equitable estoppel cannot create subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court also held that Scripture was protected by governmental immunity. Evaluating existing exemptions and reporting or recommending their denial were within a township assessor’s statutory authority, and Hembree alleged, at most, negligence or error—not conduct so reckless as to constitute gross negligence. Her intentional-infliction claim also failed because discussions and reports questioning her residency were not sufficiently extreme and outrageous. Her appellate treatment of the limitations issue was inadequate, and any limitations question concerning the invasion-of-privacy claim was moot because that claim had independently been dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Equitable estoppel was unavailable as an independent cause of action, and Hembree could not reasonably rely on Scripture’s initial acceptance of her driver’s license as permanently establishing eligibility for an exemption subject to recurring review. Injunctive and declaratory relief likewise were remedies, not freestanding claims, and could not survive after dismissal of the substantive claims. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing a further amendment after Hembree missed the authorized deadline, and her unpreserved challenge to the allegedly chaotic summary-disposition hearing was inadequately briefed.
Key Takeaways
- A challenge seeking to establish residency and entitlement to a Michigan principal residence exemption belongs in the Michigan Tax Tribunal, not circuit court.
- A township assessor does not lose governmental immunity merely because a residency determination may have been negligent or mistaken; the alleged conduct must meet the statutory gross-negligence standard.
- Equitable estoppel, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief do not supply independent causes of action when the underlying substantive claims fail.
Why It Matters
The decision emphasizes that litigants cannot recast a property-tax exemption dispute as tort or equitable claims to obtain circuit-court review. The nature of the requested relief—here, a determination supporting entitlement to a principal residence exemption—placed the dispute within the Tax Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction.
It also underscores the procedural consequences of missed amendment deadlines and inadequate appellate briefing. A party given a limited opportunity to amend must act within the prescribed period or establish a recognized basis for relief from the resulting final order; counsel’s workload and insufficiently substantiated medical difficulties did not require reopening this case.