Background
In the early morning hours of December 31, 2023, respondent-mother arrived at Bronson Methodist Hospital in Kalamazoo, Michigan with her infant daughter DTR after the two were removed from a homeless shelter. Hospital staff raised concerns about DTR’s small size and possible malnourishment, but respondent refused to allow staff to take the child’s vitals or run tests, and allegedly became aggressive when denied pain medication. A Children’s Protective Services (CPS) worker who observed respondent during this visit noted that she appeared to be speaking to people who were not present. Unable to secure safe shelter for the pair, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) obtained an ex parte removal order. During the removal, respondent physically resisted police, and DTR struck her head on a doorframe during the struggle. Respondent was arrested.
Over the following two years, DHHS provided respondent with extensive services including a psychological evaluation, mental health counseling, medication management, housing assistance, childcare and disability services, and employment assistance. Early review hearings showed modest progress—respondent obtained employment and was participating in services—but her behavior deteriorated markedly by late 2024 and into 2025. She was arrested at least eight times during the pendency of the case on charges including trespassing, retail fraud, malicious destruction of property, and disturbing the peace. She tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and psychedelics, yet declined substance abuse services because she denied having a problem. Her dog was removed by animal control due to concerns of abuse and neglect in the home.
Respondent’s conduct during parenting time grew increasingly alarming. She regularly yelled, screamed, used profanity, and threw objects in front of DTR, leaving the child unable to engage with her. Weeks before trial, respondent left a note at a police station that read, “First start of a plan that’s soon to unfold. You took something you didn’t own. Price for that? Price to pay?” She then arrived at a supervised parenting visit “extremely escalated,” banging on DHHS walls and doors, and questioned DTR about the layout of her foster home and what she could see from the window. When police were called, respondent refused to return DTR to DHHS staff. After a termination trial concluding in December 2025, the Kalamazoo Circuit Court Family Division terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). Respondent appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the termination on all three statutory grounds, finding no clear error in the trial court’s determinations. On the conditions-continue-to-exist grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii), the court found ample record support for the conclusion that the conditions leading to adjudication—unstable housing, emotional instability, and escalated behavior—persisted throughout the nearly two-year proceeding and showed no meaningful trajectory toward resolution. Although respondent had moved into an apartment, the home was plagued by ongoing concerns: animal waste on carpeting, a large hole in the ceiling, and unauthorized occupants threatening her tenancy. More significantly, respondent’s mental health and behavioral issues not only failed to improve but worsened over time despite consistent provision of services.
On the MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) ground—reasonable likelihood of harm if the child were returned—the court agreed with the trial court that the record was “replete” with examples of respondent’s anger and outbursts overcoming her ability to parent safely. Physical risks included the injury DTR sustained during the initial removal, instances of respondent storming off and leaving DTR unattended, and the observed abuse of respondent’s dog. Emotional harm was equally documented: DTR had begun hiding from respondent at parenting visits, asked why her mother was “so mad,” developed anxiety-like symptoms surrounding visits, and by the end of the case was actively resisting going to visits. The court also affirmed the best-interests finding, noting DTR’s young age (four years old at trial), the nearly two-year removal, her strong bond with foster parents who wished to adopt her, and the complete absence of evidence that reunification was achievable in any foreseeable timeframe.
The court rejected respondent’s argument that the trial court should have considered a guardianship in lieu of termination, holding that neither of the statutory conditions precedent under MCL 712A.19a(9)(c) was satisfied: DHHS had petitioned for termination rather than guardianship, and nothing in the record indicated the foster family would have agreed to a guardianship arrangement.
Key Takeaways
- Participation in court-ordered services is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reunification—parents must also demonstrate meaningful benefit from those services; here, nearly two years of services yielded no measurable improvement in respondent’s mental health or parenting capacity.
- A parent’s persistent inability to regulate her emotions during supervised parenting time—including outbursts, thrown objects, profanity, and refusal to re-engage with the child—constitutes evidence of both ongoing conditions and likelihood of future harm under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
- A guardianship cannot be substituted for termination unless DHHS itself determines that termination is not in the child’s best interests or the court declines to order termination proceedings; a respondent cannot unilaterally raise guardianship as an alternative at trial.
- The child’s own observable responses to parenting time—hiding, anxiety symptoms, physical resistance, and statements of distress—are relevant evidence at both the statutory-grounds and best-interests stages of termination proceedings.
Why It Matters
This unpublished opinion illustrates how Michigan courts assess the adequacy of reunification efforts when a parent’s mental health and behavioral challenges are central to the child-welfare case. The decision underscores that the statutory clock for termination is tied not merely to the passage of time but to whether a parent’s trajectory gives any realistic basis for optimism within a timeframe the child can afford to wait. With DTR having spent nearly half her life in foster care by the time of trial, the court treated the child’s developmental need for permanency as a concrete, time-sensitive interest that could not be indefinitely subordinated to the parent’s ongoing struggles.
The case also serves as a practical reminder for practitioners that a respondent’s courtroom conduct during termination proceedings is fair game for judicial observation and findings. The trial court expressly noted that it had witnessed respondent’s disruptive outbursts firsthand, and the Court of Appeals treated that observation as legitimate corroborating evidence of the very behaviors that made reunification untenable.