Background
The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) initiated proceedings against respondent-mother after an investigation confirmed medical neglect of her youngest child, who was hospitalized with weight concerns and a diagnosis of “failure to thrive.” The court placed both children under DHHS supervision. The youngest child entered licensed foster care while the oldest child remained with her biological father, with whom she was already living. Respondent pleaded no contest and was ordered to complete a service plan that included maintaining housing and employment, undergoing a psychological evaluation, completing parenting classes, and addressing substance abuse.
Over the course of the case, DHHS discovered respondent was using methamphetamine. She was referred to two different outpatient SUD treatment providers but was discharged from both for inconsistent participation. When offered inpatient treatment, she refused. Her drug screens consistently returned positive. A psychological evaluation found she needed continued mental-health interventions and more intensive drug treatment. She attended parenting time inconsistently and, while she received a parenting education certificate, both her caseworker and the evaluating psychologist found she demonstrated no benefit from that training. At the termination hearing, her only verifiable income was selling plasma, occasional informal cleaning work, and nutrition assistance.
The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to both the youngest and oldest children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). Respondent appealed, challenging the reasonableness of DHHS’s efforts, the statutory grounds, and the best-interest determinations for both children.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals partially reversed. On reasonable efforts, the court found no error: DHHS offered SUD treatment twice, respondent was discharged from both providers for inconsistent participation, and when caseworkers raised inpatient options after the psychological evaluation, respondent refused. The statute places a commensurate obligation on respondents to actually participate in offered services, and respondent failed to meet that obligation. On statutory grounds, the court affirmed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)—conditions of medical neglect, substance abuse, housing instability, and employment barriers continued to exist after 182 days—and concluded that the remaining statutory ground need not be separately analyzed.
The court affirmed termination of respondent’s rights to the youngest child, finding no clear error in the best-interest determination. The youngest child had improved dramatically in foster care, had persistent medical needs requiring consistent attention, and respondent’s record demonstrated she could not reliably provide that attention. As to the oldest child, however, the court vacated the termination order and remanded for a new best-interest hearing. The trial court had failed to expressly consider that the oldest child was placed with her biological father—a relative—which under In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35 (2012), is an explicit factor weighing against termination that the court must address on the record. Without that analysis, the factual record was inadequate for a best-interest determination as to the oldest child.
Key Takeaways
- DHHS satisfies its reasonable-efforts obligation when it offers appropriate SUD services and the respondent is repeatedly discharged for non-participation or refuses more intensive care. Respondents bear a commensurate duty to engage with offered services and cannot wait until the termination hearing to argue services were inadequate.
- In a best-interest analysis, a trial court has a duty to decide each child’s best interests individually. Under In re Olive/Metts, the court must explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of a child’s relative placement. Failure to do so renders the factual record inadequate and requires reversal.
- Relative placement weighs against termination under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a), and a trial court cannot skip this analysis. The court must expressly address this factor even when it concludes termination is otherwise warranted.
- When one statutory ground is proven by clear and convincing evidence, courts need not separately analyze additional statutory grounds. See In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 (2000).
Why It Matters
In re Gilliam Minors is a useful reminder to family court practitioners on both sides of the docket about the mechanics of relative-placement analysis in termination proceedings. The opinion underscores that whenever a child is placed with a relative—including a non-custodial biological parent—the trial court must affirmatively grapple with that placement as a factor weighing against termination, regardless of how strong the evidence otherwise is. A failure to address relative placement on the record is structural error that requires a new best-interest hearing, not just reweighing on appeal.
For DHHS and prosecutors, the case confirms that a structured, documented service plan—with specific referrals, records of discharge for non-participation, and documented offers of more intensive care—will satisfy the reasonable-efforts standard even when a respondent later argues the services were insufficient. The key is documentation that respondents were offered appropriate services and chose not to engage.