In re Terrell/Evans-Terrell Minors — Affirmed termination of parental rights for three children; remanded regarding fourth child’s fictive kin placement

Case
In re Terrell/Evans-Terrell, Minors
Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Judge
Allie Greenleaf Maldonado (Gretchen Whitmer, 2022); Michael J. Riordan (Rick Snyder, 2012)
Date Decided
July 17, 2026
Docket No.
376074 (Oakland Circuit Court, Family Division, LC No. 2020-882006-NA)
Topics
Termination of Parental Rights, Best Interests of Children, Mental Health, Domestic Violence, Relative Placement
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Respondent gave birth to K1 in 2015 at age 16, followed by K2 in 2016, K3 in 2019, and K4 in late 2020. Between 2017 and 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services substantiated at least three complaints against respondent involving domestic violence, inadequate housing, and physical abuse. In July 2020, while homeless, respondent posted on Facebook suggesting she and her children “did not need to be on earth anymore,” prompting intervention by DHHS. The children were removed and respondent was ordered to comply with a treatment plan requiring suitable housing, employment, psychological evaluation, mental health services, parenting classes, and participation in parent-partner and parenting-time programs.

In September 2021, after approximately one year in care, the children were returned to respondent’s home with reunification services in place. However, this reunion lasted only one month before the children were again removed due to respondent’s homelessness following a domestic violence incident with her long-time boyfriend involving both victim and perpetrator roles. The incident occurred in front of the children. Respondent was then given an additional two years to work toward reunification, but her compliance remained inconsistent, marked by ongoing domestic violence and emotional instability. In January 2024, DHHS petitioned to terminate parental rights. Following hearings in summer and fall 2024, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (c)(i), and (j). In April 2025, after separate hearings, the trial court found termination was in the children’s best interests.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights as to K1, K2, and K3, finding a preponderance of evidence supported the trial court’s best-interests determination. The court identified critical factors weighing toward termination: respondent’s mental and emotional instability impaired her parenting ability and prevented her from ensuring the children’s safety. Despite multiple referrals over several years, respondent failed to meaningfully engage in individual therapy and refused to comply with recommended medications. A clinical psychologist testified that respondent remained emotionally unstable at the time of termination, with demonstrated inability to regulate emotions—during the evaluation she became emotional and elevated her voice, and during the best-interest hearing she threatened a caseworker in open court. The children had witnessed respondent’s aggressive outbursts; one child hid in fear. Critically, respondent lacked insight into how her actions negatively affected the children, making it unlikely she would be motivated to change. While bonds existed between respondent and K1 and K2, these bonds were unhealthy because the children felt compelled to protect their mother. The bonds with K3 and K4 were minimal.

The court found respondent’s history of domestic violence remained a serious concern despite completion of a domestic violence program. Expert testimony established that respondent minimized the extent of violence in her relationship, raising significant concerns that children returned to her care would face continued exposure. The children’s need for permanency, stability, and finality heavily favored termination. At termination, K1 was nine, K2 was eight, K3 was five, and K4 was four; they had known little stability in their short lives. The foster placements provided superior care with all the children’s needs met, and caregivers had expressed interest in adoption—the only pathway to finality and adoption lay through termination.

However, as to K4, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. K4’s situation differed significantly because the child was placed with “fictive kin”—a caregiver not related by blood, marriage, or adoption but with strong emotional ties to the child or parent. The trial court and parties never clarified whether this placement satisfied the definition of “relative” under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(ii), as amended by 2022 PA 200 (effective October 7, 2022), which expanded “relative” to include qualifying fictive kin. Because relative placement is a statutory factor weighing against termination, the trial court must expressly consider this on remand and determine whether K4’s caregiver qualifies, then weigh that placement against termination of rights.

Key Takeaways

  • A parent’s persistent refusal to meaningfully engage in mental health treatment despite multiple referrals, coupled with failure to comply with medication recommendations, can support termination of parental rights when the parent’s instability directly affects parenting capacity and children’s safety.
  • Demonstrated inability to regulate emotions, particularly when children have witnessed aggressive outbursts and expressed fear, constitutes clear evidence that the parent’s behavior models unhealthy coping skills and endangers children’s emotional well-being.
  • Even strong parent-child bonds can weigh toward termination rather than preservation when those bonds are unhealthy—specifically when children feel compelled to protect or shield the parent from consequences, undermining their own safety and wellbeing.
  • Parental minimization of domestic violence history after years of treatment raises valid concerns about future exposure risk, even if a parent has completed batterer intervention programs and no incidents occurred in the recent term.
  • Trial courts must now expressly consider whether a child’s placement with fictive kin satisfies the statutory definition of “relative” under MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(ii); relative placement is a mandatory factor weighing against termination, though not dispositive of best interests.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies the evidentiary weight of parental mental health engagement in child welfare termination cases. Michigan courts will no longer view completion of programs in isolation; persistent refusal to participate meaningfully in individual therapy or comply with psychiatric medication, despite years of opportunities and court orders, constitutes strong evidence of parenting inability. The decision also establishes that timing matters: minimal compliance efforts initiated only after a permanency petition is filed, following years of non-compliance, carries limited persuasive weight and does not establish an upward trend.

Critically, the remand regarding K4 signals that the 2022 statutory expansion of “relative” to include fictive kin is not merely definitional but carries mandatory substantive consequences. Trial courts must expressly determine whether a caregiver qualifies as a fictive kin relative under the amended statute and must weigh that relative placement as a factor against termination. This protects children in non-traditional kinship placements by requiring explicit judicial consideration of their relational status—a meaningful procedural safeguard introduced by the 2022 amendment that was overlooked in the original proceedings.

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