Background
Donyelle Michael Black was convicted after a 1988 bench trial of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm for crimes committed when he was 15. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for felony murder. After the U.S. Supreme Court barred mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles and made that rule retroactive, prosecutors sought to reimpose Black’s sentence through a Miller hearing.
At the first Miller hearing, a defense psychologist testified about Black’s adolescent development, difficult childhood, maturation, and potential for rehabilitation. The prosecution presented no witnesses, and the trial court reimposed life without parole while stating that the prosecution did not bear the burden of proof. After the Michigan Supreme Court held in another case that prosecutors must rebut the presumption against juvenile life without parole by clear and convincing evidence, the Court of Appeals vacated Black’s sentence and ordered a second Miller hearing.
Before that hearing, the trial court ordered Black either to undergo an examination by a prosecution-selected psychologist or to forgo his own expert psychological evidence. The court also purported to incorporate the evidence from the first hearing into the second. The Court of Appeals upheld the compelled-examination order, and Black sought review in the Michigan Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
In a unanimous opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court held that when a defendant indicates an intent to offer expert psychological evidence based on an examination at a Miller hearing, the trial court may require the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert. Conditioning the defense evidence on such an examination does not violate the federal or Michigan constitutional protections against self-incrimination because the prosecution may use the resulting evidence only to rebut psychological evidence the defendant actually presents.
The court further held that a defendant may be required to decide before the hearing whether to undergo the prosecution examination. Sitting for the examination does not commit the defendant to presenting psychological evidence later. If the defendant ultimately offers no such evidence after the prosecution rests, the prosecution cannot use the examination. Any rebuttal must also remain within the scope of the defense evidence, and the examination cannot serve as a means of general interrogation.
The court affirmed the Court of Appeals but partially vacated the trial court’s orders. Because the first sentence and hearing had been vacated, the second Miller hearing must begin anew under the correct burden of proof. The trial court therefore could not incorporate the first hearing’s record automatically or rely on Black’s earlier indication that he intended to present psychological evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings before the same judge.
Key Takeaways
- A juvenile-lifer defendant who plans to offer examination-based expert psychological evidence may be required to undergo a comparable examination by a prosecution expert.
- Evidence obtained through the compelled examination is limited to rebuttal and cannot be introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
- The prosecution may use the examination only if the defense actually presents psychological evidence, and its rebuttal cannot exceed the scope of that evidence.
- Black’s second Miller hearing must start anew, with prosecutors required to rebut the presumption against life without parole by clear and convincing evidence.
Why It Matters
The decision establishes a framework for psychological evidence in Michigan Miller hearings. It preserves the prosecution’s ability to answer a defense expert with an expert who has also examined the defendant while limiting how compelled statements may be obtained and used.
The ruling also reinforces the distinct procedural protections governing juvenile life-without-parole proceedings. A new Miller hearing cannot simply carry forward a record developed under an erroneous allocation of the burden of proof, and the prosecution remains responsible for justifying the extraordinary sentence of life without parole.