People v. Black — Court allowed a prosecution psychological exam only to rebut defense expert evidence at juvenile resentencing

Case
People of the State of Michigan v. Donyelle Michael Black
Court
Michigan Supreme Court
Judge
Noah P. Hood (Gretchen Whitmer, 2025)
Date Decided
July 30, 2026
Docket No.
168159
Topics
Juvenile sentencing; Self-incrimination; Psychological examinations; Life without parole
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Donyelle Michael Black was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm for crimes committed when he was 15. He received life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for felony murder. After the United States Supreme Court prohibited mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences and made that rule retroactive, Michigan prosecutors sought to reimpose Black’s sentence through a Miller resentencing hearing.

At the first Miller hearing, a defense psychologist testified about Black’s adolescent characteristics, difficult upbringing, maturation, and potential for rehabilitation. The prosecution presented no witnesses, and the trial court reimposed life without parole while stating that the prosecution bore no burden of proof. After the Michigan Supreme Court held in another case that prosecutors must rebut the presumption against juvenile life without parole by clear and convincing evidence, the Court of Appeals vacated Black’s sentence and ordered a new hearing.

Before the second hearing, the trial court ordered Black either to undergo an examination by a prosecution-selected psychologist or to forgo his own expert psychological evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Black appealed, arguing that the condition violated his constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

The Court’s Holding

The Michigan Supreme Court unanimously held that when a defendant indicates an intent to introduce expert psychological evidence based on an examination at a Miller hearing, the trial court may require the defendant to undergo a similar examination by a prosecution expert. That condition does not violate the federal or Michigan constitutional privilege against self-incrimination because the prosecution may use the resulting evidence only to rebut psychological evidence the defense actually presents.

The court further held that Black may be required to decide before the hearing whether to undergo the examination. Sitting for the examination does not commit him to presenting psychological evidence: after the prosecution rests, he may decline to offer such evidence, in which case the prosecution cannot use its examination. Any rebuttal must also remain within the scope of the defense evidence, and an examination cannot serve as a means of general interrogation.

The court affirmed the Court of Appeals but vacated the trial court’s orders insofar as they incorporated the first hearing’s record or relied on Black’s earlier intent to offer psychological evidence. The second hearing is a distinct proceeding that must begin anew, with the prosecution bearing the burden to rebut the presumption against life without parole by clear and convincing evidence. The case was remanded to the same trial judge.

Key Takeaways

  • A juvenile-lifer defendant who plans to offer examination-based expert psychological evidence may be required to undergo a comparable examination by a prosecution expert.
  • The prosecution may use information obtained directly or derivatively from that examination only in rebuttal, not in its case-in-chief, and only within the scope opened by the defense evidence.
  • A new Miller hearing must proceed independently from a vacated earlier hearing, with the prosecution proving by clear and convincing evidence that life without parole is warranted.

Why It Matters

The decision establishes a framework for psychological evidence in Michigan Miller hearings: defendants retain control over whether to present such evidence, while prosecutors receive a limited opportunity to test it through an examination of their own. The ruling simultaneously preserves the adversarial process and restricts how compelled statements may be used.

For trial courts, the opinion also underscores the need for carefully tailored examination orders, protective procedures, and strict separation between the prosecution’s affirmative proof and rebuttal evidence. Justice Kimberly A. Thomas’s concurrence highlighted unresolved procedural questions, including who should conduct compelled examinations and what safeguards should govern them.

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