Background
In 2009, Joshua Eberline was living with his sister’s family in Montrose, Michigan, while on parole. His then-six-year-old niece, EG, testified that he sexually touched her during that period. She did not report the abuse until seventh grade and police were not contacted until 2020, roughly a decade after the offense. Eberline was originally charged with one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), but after his preliminary examination the charge was upgraded to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) based on testimony suggesting penetration. Mid-trial, the prosecution moved to add a second count of CSC-II, which the trial court permitted.
The prosecution also introduced other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27a: two other young girls, DM and MM, had alleged in 2010 that Eberline similarly touched them after he moved in with their family. Though those allegations led to no criminal charges, they resulted in a parole violation finding and an extension of Eberline’s parole. The Genesee Circuit Court admitted the other-acts testimony over defense objection. The jury convicted Eberline on both counts, and the court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual offender to 30–60 years for CSC-I and 5–22.5 years for CSC-II, concurrent. The 30-year CSC-I minimum exceeded the statutory 25-year mandatory minimum.
Eberline appealed on three grounds: (1) that convicting him of both CSC-I and CSC-II for a single act violated double jeopardy; (2) that the other-acts evidence was improperly admitted; and (3) that the trial court failed to adequately justify sentencing him above the mandatory minimum.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed on all three issues. On double jeopardy, the court held that convicting a defendant of both CSC-I and CSC-II for the same act does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each offense requires proof of an element the other does not — CSC-I requires sexual penetration while CSC-II requires that the sexual contact be done for a sexual purpose. Relying on People v. Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85 (2014), and the Blockburger test, the court rejected Eberline’s argument that CSC-II is a lesser included offense of CSC-I.
On the other-acts evidence, the court held that MCL 768.27a governed admissibility and that the prosecution’s notice, though filed one day late, fell within the statute’s good-cause exception. The court further held that the evidence satisfied MRE 403 after weighing the Watkins factors: the prior acts were substantially similar, temporally proximate to the charged offense, and the prosecution had a significant need for corroboration given the decade-long delay in reporting and the absence of physical evidence. The court distinguished Andrew v. White, 604 US 86 (2025), finding no due process violation because, unlike in that case, the other-acts evidence was genuinely probative.
On sentencing, the court held that the trial court adequately explained its upward departure from the 25-year mandatory minimum by expressly adopting the same reasoning it articulated for the CSC-II sentence — that Eberline exploited a position of familial trust to abuse multiple young girls who suffered lasting trauma. The court noted that the sentencing guidelines contemplate only a single act against a single victim, and the trial court’s evident reliance on DM’s testimony as an additional victim reasonably justified the additional five years above the mandatory minimum.
Key Takeaways
- Under Blockburger and binding Michigan precedent, a single act of child sexual abuse can support simultaneous convictions of both CSC-I and CSC-II without violating double jeopardy, because the offenses have non-overlapping elements.
- MCL 768.27a allows propensity evidence of prior sexual offenses against minors in child-CSC prosecutions; notice filed one day late may still satisfy the statute’s good-cause exception, particularly where the defendant had independent possession of the underlying records.
- A sentencing court need not deliver a separate, elaborate rationale for each count; expressly cross-referencing the reasoning stated for a related count can satisfy the obligation to articulate proportionality when departing upward from a mandatory minimum.
- The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Andrew v. White does not bar other-acts evidence that survives MRE 403 balancing; the due-process concern in Andrew was directed at evidence that was prejudicial yet wholly irrelevant.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad reach of Michigan’s MCL 768.27a in child-sexual-assault prosecutions. By allowing propensity evidence that would be excluded in most other criminal contexts, the statute tips the evidentiary balance significantly toward the prosecution in cases that often turn entirely on victim credibility and lack corroborating physical evidence. Defense counsel in these cases must confront not only the charged conduct but also uncharged acts — even ones that never resulted in prosecution — so long as the prosecution satisfies a flexible notice requirement.
The court’s handling of the sentencing issue also signals that Michigan appellate courts will affirm upward departures where the trial court’s on-the-record reasoning, even if brief, reflects a considered assessment of the offense’s severity and the offender’s conduct. Attorneys litigating CSC sentencing departures should note that the guidelines’ single-victim, single-act framework may itself be cited as a structural justification for exceeding the statutory floor when evidence of additional victims is presented at trial.