Background
Police responding to a reported single-vehicle crash on a rural, icy road encountered Jason Allen Evans walking away from the crash’s direction late at night in near-zero temperatures. A trooper observed Evans stumbling, slurring his speech, and exhibiting bloodshot eyes, and detected a strong odor of alcohol. Evans repeatedly tried to leave and refused commands to remain while officers investigated, prompting the trooper to handcuff him and place him in a patrol vehicle.
Officers found Evans’s damaged car against a tree, with a single set of fresh footprints leading from the driver’s side toward the place where Evans was detained. The vehicle contained mail addressed to Evans, beer, and empty cans. A warranted blood draw showed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.204. Although a defense witness claimed he—not Evans—had driven and crashed the vehicle, a jury convicted Evans of third-offense operating while intoxicated, assaulting or resisting a police officer, and driving with a suspended license. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences, including 36 months to 10 years for operating while intoxicated.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Evans’s suppression motion. The trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop Evans based on the nearby crash, the remote location, Evans’s direction of travel, his apparent intoxication, and the extreme weather. Handcuffing Evans and placing him in the patrol car remained reasonable in light of his repeated efforts to leave; alternatively, the trooper already had probable cause to arrest him for operating while intoxicated. Because probable cause existed before the pat-down, the discovery and examination of Evans’s wallet and identification were permissible as a search incident to arrest.
The affidavit supporting the blood-draw warrant established a fair probability that Evans had driven while intoxicated because it described him walking away from the crash and displaying multiple signs of intoxication. The court treated Evans’s Miranda argument as abandoned because he addressed custody but failed to establish that any admitted statements resulted from interrogation. It also held that his challenges to the refusal of certain defense instructions and to the general unanimity instruction were abandoned or waived, and that no specific-unanimity instruction was required because the alleged forms of resisting and obstructing were alternative means within one course of conduct.
Finally, the court rejected Evans’s claim that the sentencing judge punished him for exercising his right to trial or refusing to admit guilt. Read in context, the judge’s remarks concerned the perceived fabrication of defense testimony, Evans’s lack of rehabilitation, his long history of similar offenses, and the danger his conduct posed to the public—not his decision to demand a jury trial.
Key Takeaways
- Reasonable suspicion supported the investigative stop because the totality of the circumstances rationally connected Evans to the nearby crash and suggested intoxicated driving.
- Handcuffs and placement in a patrol vehicle did not make the detention unlawful where Evans repeatedly attempted to leave; in any event, probable cause independently supported an arrest.
- A general unanimity instruction was sufficient because the alleged acts of resisting or obstructing were alternative means of committing one offense during a single course of conduct.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision illustrates Michigan’s fact-specific approach to determining when a Terry stop involving handcuffs and a patrol vehicle remains an investigative detention and when probable cause independently validates the restraint. It also confirms that a search immediately preceding a formal arrest may qualify as incident to arrest when probable cause already exists.
The opinion further underscores the need to develop both components of a Miranda claim—custody and interrogation—and distinguishes an impermissible sentencing penalty for maintaining innocence from a court’s consideration of perceived dishonesty, lack of remorse, rehabilitation prospects, and danger to the community.