Background
Daren Fenderson was arrested and charged with first-degree premeditated murder, felony-firearm, and escape from lawful custody in connection with a fatal shooting in Detroit. The day after his arrest, Detroit Police Sergeant Reginald Beasley and Detective Douglas Williams conducted a videorecorded interrogation. Fenderson received standard Miranda warnings and signed an advice-of-rights form, initially agreeing to speak without counsel. After roughly ninety minutes of questioning — during which police pressed him on alleged inconsistencies in his account and told him they had a “video of it happening” — Fenderson invoked his right to counsel, asking for an appointed attorney.
Beasley left to locate an attorney. Nearly three hours later, Beasley returned without one. He told Fenderson “you don’t got one,” explained that no attorney was available, and stated that Fenderson had “no money” to hire one — without clarifying that Miranda entitles indigent suspects to appointed counsel. Fenderson repeatedly expressed confusion. Police then told him that “the story you got is the story we gon’ go with” and explained that if he wanted to speak, he would have to affirmatively waive his right to counsel. Fenderson eventually said he wanted “to get this over with” and agreed to talk without an attorney. A second sergeant re-administered Miranda warnings; Fenderson initialed another form while again expressing that he did not understand what was happening. Beasley and Williams then returned, and Fenderson made incriminating statements.
The Wayne Circuit Court granted Fenderson’s motion to suppress, finding that police had undermined the advice of rights Miranda requires and had reinitiated interrogation after his invocation. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision, concluding that Fenderson’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent based on his age, education, and lack of physical coercion. The Michigan Supreme Court granted oral argument on the application for leave to appeal.
The Court’s Holding
In a 6–1 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the suppression order. The Court held that police violated Fenderson’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981). Under Edwards, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, all interrogation must cease unless and until counsel is provided or the suspect himself reinitiates communication with police. The Court found that neither condition was met here.
The majority focused on what police told Fenderson after returning empty-handed: that he had no attorney and could not use his arrest money to hire one. Those statements, the Court held, reasonably implied that the right to have counsel present during questioning was contingent on the ability to pay for one — directly contradicting Miranda’s guarantee that counsel will be appointed at public expense for suspects who cannot afford an attorney. Fenderson’s repeated expressions of confusion and his multiple clarifying questions demonstrated that he did not understand his actual rights. By conveying that indigency left him without a right to counsel during questioning, police undermined the advice of rights and created the precise confusion Miranda is designed to prevent.
The Court also rejected the prosecution’s argument that Fenderson reinitiated the interrogation. His question “So what’s going on?” arose in the context of trying to understand why he had no attorney — it was not, the Court held, an affirmative request to speak about the case without counsel as Edwards requires. Furthermore, police engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when, after that question, they resumed the pre-invocation theme that Fenderson’s story had holes and told him a waiver was his only path to offering a different account. The subsequent Miranda re-advisals and waiver did not cure the constitutional violation because the confusion about Fenderson’s right to appointed counsel had never been corrected. All statements following his invocation must be suppressed.
Key Takeaways
- After a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police may not resume interrogation — directly or through its functional equivalent — unless counsel is actually provided or the suspect unambiguously reinitiates on his own; confusion engineered by misleading statements does not substitute for genuine reinitiation.
- Telling an indigent suspect that no attorney is available “because you have no money” violates Miranda because it falsely implies that the right to counsel during questioning turns on financial ability to hire private counsel, when Miranda in fact guarantees appointed counsel for those who cannot afford one.
- A subsequent re-reading of Miranda warnings and a signed waiver form does not cure a prior constitutional violation if the suspect’s confusion about his rights has not actually been resolved — as shown here by Fenderson’s continued statements that he did not understand what was happening.
- A suspect’s question asking what will happen next, asked in the context of trying to understand why no attorney arrived, does not constitute reinitiation of interrogation under Edwards.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict prophylactic rule of Edwards v. Arizona and clarifies how courts must assess the adequacy of Miranda warnings in practice, not just in form. Advising a suspect of the right to appointed counsel means nothing if police then affirmatively suggest — even without a direct lie — that indigency forecloses that right. Defense attorneys can use this decision to challenge suppression rulings where police communications after an invocation of counsel were incomplete, misleading, or conditioned the right to counsel on factors Miranda does not permit.
The ruling also signals that Michigan courts will look carefully at the totality of the post-invocation atmosphere — including the functional equivalent of interrogation — rather than focusing narrowly on whether formal re-advisals were given and forms were signed. For law enforcement, the case is a reminder that once a suspect invokes counsel, the obligation is not merely to stop asking direct questions, but to refrain from any communication that pressures the suspect toward waiver or misrepresents the scope of rights Miranda guarantees.