Background
Daren Fenderson was arrested in connection with a fatal shooting in Detroit and charged with first-degree premeditated murder, felony-firearm, and escape from lawful custody. The day after his arrest, Detroit Police Sergeant Reginald Beasley and Detective Douglas Williams conducted a videorecorded custodial interrogation. Beasley provided standard Miranda warnings and Fenderson signed an advice-of-rights form. After roughly ninety minutes of questioning — during which officers pressed Fenderson about inconsistencies in his account and told him they had a video of the shooting — Fenderson invoked his right to appointed counsel. Questioning stopped and Beasley left to attempt to locate an attorney.
Nearly three hours after the invocation, Beasley returned without an attorney. He told Fenderson he did not have a lawyer and that he could not use the cash seized from him at arrest to hire one — statements that, on the record, could only be understood as suggesting that appointment of counsel was contingent on the suspect’s ability to pay. When Fenderson asked, “So what’s going on?”, Beasley told him his current story was the one that would go forward unless he agreed to keep talking. After a series of exchanges in which Fenderson repeatedly expressed confusion and a desire to “get this over with,” he agreed to speak without counsel and ultimately made incriminating statements.
The Wayne Circuit Court suppressed the statements, finding that police had used the unavailability of an attorney as a “scare tactic” and had undermined the Miranda advice of rights. The Court of Appeals reversed in a divided panel opinion, concluding that Fenderson’s waiver was voluntary based on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The Michigan Supreme Court granted oral argument on defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
The Court’s Holding
In a 6-1 decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s suppression order. The Court held that police violated Fenderson’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981). Once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, interrogation must cease unless counsel is made available or the suspect himself reinitiates the investigation. Neither condition was satisfied here. Police told Fenderson — inaccurately — that his right to have an attorney present was conditioned on his ability to pay for one, directly contradicting Miranda’s guarantee that counsel will be appointed if the suspect cannot afford one. That misinformation undermined the advice of rights Fenderson had received and rendered any subsequent waiver constitutionally infirm.
The Court further held that Fenderson’s question “So what’s going on?” did not constitute a reinitiation of the interrogation. Asked in the immediate context of being told he had no attorney and no means to obtain one, the question was an expression of confusion, not an affirmative request to resume questioning without counsel. The Court also concluded that police engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation after the invocation: Beasley’s statement that Fenderson’s existing story was “the story we gon’ go with” carried forward the same pressure tactics used before invocation and was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The subsequent re-reading of Miranda warnings by a third sergeant did not cure the confusion Beasley had created.
Justice Zahra dissented, concluding that police acted constitutionally — they ceased questioning upon invocation, attempted to locate counsel, accurately reported the outcome of those efforts, and obtained a repeated and knowing waiver before resuming. In his view, Fenderson’s waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.
Key Takeaways
- Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, questioning is forbidden until counsel is provided or the suspect himself reinitiates — a standard totality-of-the-circumstances waiver analysis is insufficient.
- Officers who truthfully report that no attorney was immediately available do not necessarily violate Miranda, but statements that imply the right to appointed counsel depends on the ability to pay affirmatively undermine Miranda warnings and taint any subsequent waiver.
- A suspect’s question expressing confusion about what is happening after an invocation — particularly when made in direct response to being told he has no attorney — does not constitute reinitiation of the interrogation.
- Repeating Miranda warnings after already-created confusion does not automatically cure a Fifth Amendment violation; the question is whether the confusion about the suspect’s rights was actually resolved.
- Police statements that present waiver as the only pathway to “tell another story” can constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation following an invocation of counsel.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms that the protections established in Miranda and Edwards are not satisfied by rote recitation of warnings if officers subsequently communicate information that contradicts those warnings. The ruling makes clear that telling an indigent suspect — even informally or ambiguously — that his right to counsel is unavailable because he cannot pay for one is constitutionally impermissible. For law enforcement, the case is a reminder that the accuracy and consistency of what officers say about a suspect’s rights matters as much as the formal reading of those rights.
For criminal defense practitioners, Fenderson provides a significant suppression tool in cases where post-invocation police conduct created confusion about the scope or availability of appointed counsel. It also signals that Michigan courts will scrutinize the substance of police-suspect exchanges after an invocation — not merely whether Miranda cards were signed — and that re-administration of Miranda warnings is not a cure-all when the underlying confusion remains unaddressed.