Background
Ronald Levart Hill was charged under the former version of Michigan’s ethnic-intimidation statute after a rideshare driver alleged that he threatened to harm her because of her race or ethnicity. The driver went to a gas station and hid in a bathroom until police arrived. Hill also faced charges unrelated to the issues in this appeal.
Before trial, the parties and the Oakland Circuit Court agreed that the model ethnic-intimidation instruction did not accurately state the law. The trial court ultimately adopted an instruction requiring proof that Hill acted recklessly, rather than maliciously, and removed statutory language requiring reasonable cause to believe the threatened physical contact would occur. The prosecution obtained a stay and pursued an interlocutory appeal by leave granted.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the proposed instruction improperly reduced the prosecution’s burden. Under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c), the prosecution must prove that the defendant maliciously threatened the complainant. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v. Colorado did not permit substitution of recklessness for malice because Counterman established a constitutional minimum for true-threat prosecutions, while the Michigan statute expressly required the more demanding mens rea of malice.
The court also held that the instruction must retain the requirement that there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened act would occur. That language states an element of the offense and helps ensure that the charged speech constitutes a true threat outside First Amendment protection. Although the court suggested possible wording, it left the precise instruction to the trial court, provided that the instruction requires a malicious threat and includes the reasonable-cause element. It reversed the order to the extent inconsistent with its opinion and remanded.
Key Takeaways
- An instruction for the charged offense under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require proof that the defendant maliciously threatened the complainant.
- Counterman’s recklessness standard is a constitutional floor and does not displace a statute’s express requirement of a more demanding mens rea.
- The statutory requirement of reasonable cause to believe the threatened act would occur is an element that cannot be omitted from the jury instructions.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies the elements that must be presented to the jury in Hill’s prosecution under the former ethnic-intimidation statute. It also illustrates how Counterman interacts with a criminal statute that already contains an express mens rea requirement: the First Amendment’s minimum subjective standard does not lower the burden imposed by the statute itself.
Because the opinion is unpublished, its significance should not be overstated as generally binding precedent. Its direct effect is to require revised instructions and further proceedings in this case.