Background
Ronald Levart Hill was charged under the former version of Michigan’s ethnic-intimidation statute after allegedly threatening a rideshare driver because of her race or ethnicity. The driver reportedly went to a gas station and hid in a bathroom until law enforcement arrived. Hill also faced separate charges that were not at issue in this interlocutory appeal.
The parties and the Oakland Circuit Court agreed that the model ethnic-intimidation instruction did not accurately state all elements of the offense. The trial court ultimately adopted a modified instruction requiring reckless conduct, rather than malicious conduct, and removed language requiring reasonable cause to believe that the threatened physical contact would occur. The prosecution obtained leave to appeal those rulings before trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held that the proposed instruction improperly reduced the prosecution’s burden. Under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c), the prosecution must prove that Hill maliciously threatened the complainant; instructing the jury that recklessness was the applicable mens rea did not satisfy the statute. The court explained that Counterman v. Colorado established a constitutional minimum of recklessness for true-threat prosecutions but did not displace a statute’s more demanding malice requirement.
The court also held that the instruction must include the statutory requirement that there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened act would occur. Removing that language omitted an element of the offense. The court rejected Hill’s argument that this objective component conflicted with Counterman, reasoning that it helps establish whether the communication was a constitutionally unprotected true threat. Although the court suggested possible instructional language, it left the final wording to the trial court, subject to both requirements.
Key Takeaways
- An instruction under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require proof that the defendant maliciously made the alleged threat.
- The jury must also find reasonable cause to believe that the threatened physical contact or property-related act would occur.
- Counterman’s recklessness standard is a constitutional floor for true-threat prosecutions, not a substitute for a statute’s higher mens rea requirement.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies the elements Michigan courts must include when instructing juries in prosecutions under the former ethnic-intimidation statute. Courts may modify the model instruction, but they may not replace the statutory malice requirement with recklessness or omit the reasonable-cause element.
The ruling also illustrates how Counterman interacts with statutes imposing more demanding mental-state requirements: the First Amendment decision sets the minimum subjective culpability necessary to punish threatening speech, while legislatures may require prosecutors to prove more.