Background
Ronald Levart Hill was charged under the former version of MCL 750.147b after allegedly threatening a rideshare driver because of her race or ethnicity. The driver reportedly entered a gas station and hid in a bathroom until law enforcement arrived. Hill also faced charges for assaulting or resisting a police officer and refusing to provide a DNA sample.
The parties and the Oakland Circuit Court agreed that Michigan’s model ethnic-intimidation instruction did not accurately state the law. The trial court ultimately adopted a modified instruction requiring proof that Hill acted recklessly, rather than maliciously, and removed language requiring reasonable cause to believe the threatened physical contact would occur. The prosecution obtained leave to bring an interlocutory appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that an instruction under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require the prosecution to prove that the defendant maliciously threatened the complainant. The court explained that Counterman v. Colorado established recklessness as the constitutional minimum for criminalizing true threats, but did not displace the more demanding mens rea expressly required by Michigan’s statute.
The court also held that the instruction must include some form of the statutory requirement that there be reasonable cause to believe the threatened act will occur. Removing that language omitted an element and impermissibly reduced the prosecution’s burden. The court reversed the trial court’s order to the extent inconsistent with its opinion and remanded, leaving the precise wording of the revised instruction to the trial court.
Key Takeaways
- Former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) requires proof that the defendant maliciously made the alleged threat; recklessness alone does not satisfy the statute.
- The prosecution must prove there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened physical contact or property-related act would occur.
- Counterman sets a constitutional mens rea floor for true-threat prosecutions but does not override a statute requiring a more demanding mental state.
Why It Matters
The decision identifies two requirements that Michigan trial courts must preserve when instructing juries in prosecutions under the former ethnic-intimidation statute: malice and reasonable cause to believe the threatened act would occur. An instruction omitting either requirement improperly lowers the prosecution’s burden.
The opinion also clarifies Counterman’s effect on state threat statutes: its recklessness standard is a First Amendment minimum, not a substitute for a higher mens rea enacted by the Legislature.