Background
Ronald Levart Hill was charged under the former version of Michigan’s ethnic-intimidation statute after allegedly threatening a rideshare driver because of her race or ethnicity. The driver reportedly pulled into a gas station and hid in a bathroom until police arrived. Hill also faced charges arising from his interaction with police and an alleged refusal to provide a DNA sample.
Before trial, the parties and the Oakland Circuit Court agreed that the model ethnic-intimidation instruction did not accurately state the law. The court ultimately adopted a modified instruction requiring proof that Hill recklessly made a threat with the specific intent to intimidate or harass the complainant because of her race or color. Over the prosecution’s objection, the court replaced the statute’s malice requirement with recklessness and removed language requiring reasonable cause to believe that the threatened physical contact would occur. The prosecution obtained leave to bring an interlocutory appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that an instruction under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require the prosecution to prove that the defendant maliciously threatened the complainant. The statute expressly imposed malice as the applicable mens rea, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v. Colorado did not permit the trial court to substitute recklessness. Counterman established a constitutional minimum for true-threat prosecutions; it did not displace a statute’s more demanding mental-state requirement.
The court also held that the instruction must retain some form of the statutory requirement that “there is reasonable cause to believe” the threatened act will occur. That language states an element of the offense, so deleting it improperly lowered the prosecution’s burden. The objective inquiry is consistent with Counterman and helps ensure that the charged speech constitutes an unprotected true threat. Although the appellate court suggested a possible instruction, it left the final wording to the trial court and the parties, subject to those two requirements.
The court reversed the trial court’s order to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion and remanded for further proceedings. It did not retain jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- A jury instruction under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require proof that the defendant maliciously made the alleged threat; recklessness alone cannot replace the statute’s express mens rea.
- The prosecution must prove there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened physical contact or property harm would occur because that requirement is an element of the offense.
- Counterman sets a constitutional floor for a speaker’s subjective mental state in true-threat cases but does not eliminate a higher mens rea required by state law or the objective inquiry into whether the communication was a true threat.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies how Michigan trial courts must instruct juries in prosecutions brought under the former ethnic-intimidation statute when the alleged conduct consists of threatening speech. Courts must account for both the statute’s express elements and the First Amendment rules governing true threats.
For pending cases involving conduct predating the statute’s 2025 rewrite, the opinion prevents courts from reducing the prosecution’s burden by replacing malice with recklessness or omitting the reasonable-cause element. The court nevertheless left trial judges discretion to formulate the precise instruction.