Background
Patrick John Pinkowski was a 27-year-old health officer at a children’s camp where ES, age 14, worked as a counselor-in-training. ES testified that Pinkowski touched her inner thighs and brushed against her vagina while making moaning noises. Later that night, while they were alone in the camp lodge, he directed movements for her to imitate, including gestures simulating sexual conduct, and asked why she had come there—“to have sex with me?”
Before trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of other inappropriate conduct and comments by Pinkowski involving ES during the same summer. The trial court admitted some of that evidence, including testimony that Pinkowski asked whether ES was sexually interested in him, pulled her onto a couch, placed her feet on his lap where they contacted his penis through his clothing, simulated masturbation, stared at her breasts, and discussed sexual matters with her. A jury convicted him of accosting a child for immoral purposes and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He received one year in jail for each conviction and five years’ probation.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence under MRE 404(b). Pinkowski’s intent was at issue, and his conduct toward the same minor during the same general period and at the same camp was highly probative of his sexual intent, motive, and common scheme. Its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The court also held that the jury did not need to agree unanimously on whether Pinkowski accosted, enticed, or solicited ES with the required intent, or instead encouraged her to commit a proscribed act. Those theories are alternative ways of satisfying a single element under MCL 750.145a, not distinct offenses, and the charge rested on one act—Pinkowski’s question about whether ES had come to have sex with him.
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support the accosting conviction. Viewed in the prosecution’s favor, Pinkowski’s repeated sexual gestures, prior touching of ES, and question about having sex permitted a rational jury to find that he intended to accost, solicit, induce, or encourage the 14-year-old to have sex with him.
Key Takeaways
- Other-acts evidence involving the same minor, location, and general period was admissible to establish Pinkowski’s sexual intent, motive, and common scheme.
- MCL 750.145a provides alternative means of committing one offense, so jurors did not have to agree on the particular statutory theory when the prosecution relied on a single underlying act.
- The surrounding sexual gestures, touching, and direct question about sex supplied sufficient evidence to sustain the accosting conviction.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that closely connected uncharged conduct may be admitted under Michigan’s other-acts rule when it bears directly on intent and is not used merely to show bad character. It also distinguishes between separate criminal acts requiring specific unanimity and alternative statutory means of committing the same offense.