Background
David Henry Serges was convicted of first-degree murder after an elderly woman for whom he had performed odd jobs was found beaten to death in her home. No evidence recovered from the crime scene initially identified Serges as a suspect, although witnesses reported seeing him in the neighborhood during the possible time of death. His first trial ended in a hung jury; a second jury convicted him, and he received life imprisonment without parole.
Police arrested Serges in November 2017, and the trial court later found that the arrest was on an unrelated misdemeanor charge. While he was jailed, a detective took Serges’s pants and other effects from the jail property room. More than a month later, without obtaining a warrant or Serges’s consent, police submitted the pants for DNA testing. Testing revealed a small bloodstain consistent with the victim’s DNA. Defense counsel did not move to suppress that evidence and instead argued that the blood could have transferred to Serges’s pants while he worked in the victim’s home.
After his conviction, Serges asserted that the forensic testing was an unconstitutional search and that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression. The trial court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court heard argument on Serges’s application for leave to appeal.
The Court’s Holding
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that forensic DNA testing of Serges’s pants was a search under the property-based trespass approach and was unreasonable under Article 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. Serges’s clothing was a constitutionally protected possession, and police physically examined it to obtain information. Because that analysis established a search, the Court did not need to decide whether Serges retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pants or the bloodstain.
No warrant exception justified the testing. It was not an inventory search because investigative DNA analysis was not part of any standardized booking procedure and did not serve the administrative or safety purposes of an inventory. It also was not a valid search incident to arrest: under Michigan precedent, police may not arrest and incarcerate a person for one offense and then rely on that arrest to search for evidence of an unrelated offense. The Court deferred to the trial court’s finding that Serges had initially been arrested on the misdemeanor charge, rejecting the Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion.
The Court further held that trial counsel performed unreasonably by failing to pursue a suppression motion supported by existing Michigan law. The omission prejudiced Serges because the DNA result was the only physical evidence connecting him to the crime scene, and little evidence tied him to the killing without it. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- Police conduct a search when they physically examine an arrestee’s personal effects to obtain forensic information, even if those effects are already lawfully in custody.
- Routine inventory authority does not extend to later investigative DNA testing that serves no standardized administrative or institutional-safety purpose.
- Under the Michigan Constitution, an arrest for one offense does not justify a warrantless search for evidence of an unrelated offense under the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
- Counsel’s failure to seek suppression was prejudicial because the challenged DNA evidence was the prosecution’s only physical link between Serges and the crime scene.
Why It Matters
The decision limits the government’s ability to conduct new forensic examinations of property obtained during booking. Lawful possession of an arrestee’s belongings does not give police unrestricted authority to test those belongings for evidence; absent consent, investigators ordinarily need a warrant or a genuinely applicable exception.
The ruling also underscores that counsel may be constitutionally ineffective for overlooking a viable suppression argument when the challenged evidence is central to the prosecution’s case. Justice Brian K. Zahra dissented, reasoning that Serges retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in clothing lawfully held by police and that no constitutional search occurred. Justice Noah P. Hood did not participate.