People v. Thiengtham — Court vacates murder conviction over counsel’s failure to challenge the wrong manslaughter instruction

Case
People of the State of Michigan v. Oudone Don Thiengtham
Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Judge
Thomas C. Cameron (Rick Snyder, 2017); Allie Greenleaf Maldonado (Gretchen Whitmer, 2022); Randy J. Wallace (Gretchen Whitmer, 2024)
Date Decided
August 18, 2026
Docket No.
376171
Topics
Ineffective Assistance, Jury Instructions, Voluntary Manslaughter, Second-Degree Murder
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Oudone Don Thiengtham confronted Anton Mason at a motel after paying him $10 for marijuana that Mason did not deliver. During the ensuing altercation, Raymond Kidd appeared to fire a taser at Thiengtham and later chased and struck him with a chain. Thiengtham kicked Kidd, pursued him after Kidd ran away, and fatally stabbed him multiple times. A jury convicted Thiengtham of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 13.5 to 30 years in prison.

Defense counsel requested an instruction permitting the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Although the trial court agreed, it gave the standalone voluntary-manslaughter instruction, M Crim JI 16.8, instead of the lesser-included-offense instruction, M Crim JI 16.9. After an earlier appeal and a Michigan Supreme Court remand for an evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she had failed to recognize the instructional mistake and that her failure to object was not strategic. The trial court nevertheless denied Thiengtham’s motion for a new trial.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals held that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recognize and object to the incorrect voluntary-manslaughter instruction. The instruction given was nearly identical to the second-degree-murder instruction and did not explain that murder may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter when adequate provocation causes a defendant to kill in the heat of passion before a reasonable cooling-off period has passed. Counsel’s admitted oversight therefore fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance.

The court also found prejudice. A rational view of the evidence supported a voluntary-manslaughter instruction because Thiengtham faced two larger men, weapons, and a continuing confrontation that included a taser and metal chain. A reasonable jury could have rejected self-defense yet found that adequate provocation caused Thiengtham to act in the heat of passion, negating the malice required for murder. The court vacated the conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial.

Key Takeaways

  • When voluntary manslaughter is submitted as a lesser included offense of murder, the jury must receive an instruction that meaningfully explains heat of passion, adequate provocation, and the absence of a reasonable cooling-off period.
  • Defense counsel performed deficiently by approving the wrong instruction when the failure to object resulted from oversight rather than trial strategy.
  • A jury’s rejection of self-defense does not foreclose voluntary manslaughter because it may still find adequate provocation and heat of passion that negate malice.

Why It Matters

The decision underscores that merely naming voluntary manslaughter as an alternative is insufficient if the instructions do not explain how it differs from murder. Where the evidence rationally supports mitigation, counsel’s failure to ensure that the jury receives the proper lesser-offense instruction can undermine confidence in a murder conviction and require a new trial.

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