Background
On November 22, 2022, thirteen-year-old RS was struck by a pickup truck driven by Donna Wall while crossing a street near his school in Waterford, Michigan. Rather than using a nearby crosswalk, RS cut across the street to reach his neighbor’s car parked in a church lot. He walked between two vehicles stopped at a red light, checked traffic briefly, then continued into the opposite lane without stopping. He did not see the oncoming pickup until moments before impact, when he “didn’t really have any time to react.” RS suffered a concussion, bruised limbs, and a fractured tailbone.
Donna Wall testified she was traveling approximately 15 miles per hour as she accelerated out of a left turn from a stopped position. Her lane of traffic appeared clear. RS suddenly darted out from between the stopped vehicles, giving her no opportunity to stop. Three eyewitnesses and the investigating officer confirmed Donna had no time to avoid the collision.
RS, through his next friend Amy Serratos, sued Donna Wall and her husband Gary Wall (the vehicle owner) for negligence in March 2024. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing Donna was not negligent and that RS was more than 50% at fault. The trial court granted the motion on December 17, 2024. RS appealed, arguing the trial court should have delayed ruling pending completion of a vehicle inspection.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition in defendants’ favor on two independent grounds. First, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider RS’s second, tardy response to the summary disposition motion. RS’s initial response, filed on the December 11 deadline, merely asserted that an ongoing vehicle inspection prevented adequate response to the motion. The court found this insufficient—RS had filed a substantive second response the next day, demonstrating that the inspection was not actually necessary to mount a defense. The court rejected RS’s attempt to treat the second response as supplemental without requesting leave to file a supplemental brief.
More significantly, the court held that Donna was not negligent as a matter of law. Under Michigan negligence standards, RS must prove Donna owed him a duty, breached it, causing damages. The evidence established that Donna was traveling at a reasonable speed (approximately 15 mph) appropriate for a school zone and the conditions she faced—her lane was clear until RS suddenly emerged from between stopped vehicles. The court emphasized that mere proof an accident occurred is insufficient to impose liability; negligence must be inferred from the defendant’s actions. Here, no evidence suggested Donna was speeding, violating any traffic law, or breaching any duty to RS.
Additionally, the sudden-emergency doctrine applied. This doctrine modifies the standard of care when a driver faces an unexpected hazard requiring instantaneous action. The hazard here was “unsuspected”—Donna’s lane was clear until the moment RS darted out, and all eyewitnesses testified she had no time to stop. Her instinctive reaction to brake was the reasonable response the law expects. The court stated: “The law expects prudence, not perfection,” and Donna was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Key Takeaways
- Pedestrians who fail to use available crosswalks and dart into traffic bear primary responsibility for resulting accidents, even when injured.
- The sudden-emergency doctrine protects drivers from negligence liability when they face unexpected hazards created by others’ negligent conduct and respond with reasonable emergency action.
- Drivers are not required to anticipate that pedestrians will dart out suddenly from between parked vehicles; a clear traffic lane creates no duty to drive at speeds slower than safe and reasonable for prevailing conditions.
- Summary disposition is appropriate when, as a matter of law, the defendant owed no breach-able duty or breached no duty, foreclosing any genuine issue for trial.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces fundamental principles of comparative negligence in pedestrian-vehicle accidents. RS was 13 years old and aware of the crosswalk’s location, yet chose a faster but dangerous route. Michigan courts have long held that pedestrians must exercise reasonable care for their own safety, and courts will not impose liability on drivers for accidents caused by pedestrians’ sudden, unexpected conduct. The opinion clarifies that the sudden-emergency doctrine is not a shield for genuinely careless driving but a recognition that drivers cannot be held to superhuman reaction times or hindsight judgments.
For practitioners, the decision reinforces that summary disposition motions filed timely with proper evidentiary support will be decided on their merits without delay for incomplete discovery, particularly when the nonmoving party fails to timely request additional time through formal motions. It also illustrates how Michigan courts apply comparative fault principles in pedestrian cases—emphasizing the pedestrian’s duty to use available safety features and cross responsibly, not merely the driver’s adherence to posted speed limits.