Background
After leaving his job with Sweetland Transportation, Lee Roy Stallman contacted the Oakland County Sheriff’s Department for help obtaining his final paycheck and personal belongings. Deputy Darius Zajac responded. After leaving the premises, Stallman called Sweetland repeatedly and left voicemails threatening to follow staff members to their homes and other locations, including schools, while referencing a workplace shooting. Zajac warned Stallman to stop calling and not to return to the business.
The next day, Stallman followed Zajac back toward Sweetland and stopped on what was later determined to be a public road alongside the property. After employees reported that Stallman was yelling and gesturing and appeared frightened by him, Zajac approached and arrested Stallman. Stallman resisted being restrained, and Zajac used a Taser before handcuffing him. Prosecutors charged Stallman with resisting or obstructing an officer, but the circuit court dismissed the charge after concluding that Zajac had not lawfully arrested him for disorderly conduct. Stallman then sued Zajac, the sheriff’s department, and Oakland County for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, vicarious liability, and breach of claimed third-party-beneficiary rights.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held that Zajac was entitled to individual governmental immunity from the intentional-tort claims. His actions occurred during his employment, were discretionary, and were undertaken in good faith. Although the road proved to be public and the criminal court had found the disorderly-conduct arrest unlawful, the record showed that Zajac honestly believed probable cause existed in light of Stallman’s threatening messages, the employees’ fear, and Stallman’s return to the area. A mistaken belief did not defeat immunity absent malice or bad faith.
Alternatively, the court held that Zajac was entitled to summary disposition on the merits. The facts known to him supplied probable cause to arrest Stallman for misdemeanor stalking, even though Zajac did not identify stalking as the basis for the arrest at the time. Probable cause defeated the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, while Zajac’s conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support intentional infliction of emotional distress. The criminal court’s earlier probable-cause ruling did not collaterally estop Zajac because he was neither a party to nor in privity with the prosecution.
The court also held that Oakland County was immune from vicarious liability because Zajac was performing a governmental function and no statutory exception applied. Because Stallman could not obtain a judgment against Zajac, his claim under the county’s indemnification agreement also failed. The court affirmed summary disposition for Oakland County, reversed the denial of summary disposition for Zajac, and remanded for entry of judgment for all three defendants, including the sheriff’s department.
Key Takeaways
- An officer may receive governmental immunity for an intentional tort when the officer acts within the scope of employment, exercises discretion, and honestly believes in good faith that probable cause exists, even if that belief is mistaken.
- Probable cause may rest on an offense different from the one the arresting officer identified at the time; here, the known facts established probable cause for misdemeanor stalking.
- A probable-cause ruling in a plaintiff’s criminal case does not necessarily bind an officer in a later civil action when the officer was not a party to or in privity with the prosecution.
Why It Matters
The decision separates the legality of an arrest from the good-faith inquiry governing individual governmental immunity. An officer’s mistaken legal or factual assessment will not alone permit intentional-tort claims to proceed when the undisputed circumstances demonstrate an honest, nonmalicious exercise of police discretion.
The opinion also underscores that courts evaluate probable cause objectively based on the facts known at the time, rather than solely on the offense announced by the officer. For governmental employers, it confirms that the GTLA generally bars vicarious liability for an officer’s conduct undertaken as part of a governmental function when no statutory exception applies.