Background
William J. Trice alleged that Michael Steven Cremonte, while driving a van owned by Roseville Community Schools in the course of his employment, crossed the center of Groesbeck Highway and collided head-on with Trice’s vehicle. Trice claimed that Cremonte’s reckless and grossly negligent conduct caused his injuries.
Cremonte and the school district moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that governmental immunity barred the claims because Trice’s complaint did not expressly identify an immunity exception and did not adequately allege gross negligence. Trice responded with the complaint’s factual allegations and a traffic-crash report stating that Cremonte drifted into opposing traffic, struck multiple vehicles, and ultimately came to rest on top of Trice’s vehicle. The circuit court denied the motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Trice adequately pleaded facts bringing his claim against Roseville Community Schools within MCL 691.1405, the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity. The complaint alleged that a school employee negligently operated a school-owned vehicle in the course of employment and caused bodily injury. Michigan’s notice-pleading rules did not require Trice to invoke the Governmental Tort Liability Act, cite the statute, or use specific words such as “governmental immunity” or “exception.”
As to Cremonte, the court held that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding gross negligence and therefore whether he was entitled to employee immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). Because the motion arose under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the court could consider documentary evidence beyond the complaint. Viewed in Trice’s favor, the crash report could allow a reasonable juror to find that Cremonte acted with a substantial lack of concern for whether injury would result. The court declined to consider defendants’ newly raised, unpreserved appellate argument that the complaint did not allege gross negligence was “the proximate cause” of Trice’s injuries.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff may plead around governmental immunity by alleging facts fitting a statutory exception; no “magic words” or statutory citation is required.
- Allegations that a government employee negligently caused injury while operating a government-owned vehicle sufficiently implicated Michigan’s motor-vehicle exception.
- On a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), courts may consider documentary evidence beyond the pleadings, and the crash report created a factual dispute over the driver’s alleged gross negligence.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces Michigan’s notice-pleading standard in governmental-immunity cases. Government defendants cannot obtain dismissal merely because a complaint omits express references to immunity or the statute when its factual allegations plainly fit a recognized exception.
It also highlights the importance of the procedural ground selected for summary disposition. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits consideration of supporting evidence, so an argument confined to supposed pleading defects may fail when the broader record creates a factual dispute over immunity.