Background
Jordan L. Oslund, a painter for The Paint Genie, Inc., was discharged in March 2024 and applied for unemployment benefits. The Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development determined he was ineligible because of employment misconduct and mailed its determination to his last known address on April 29, 2024.
The determination said Oslund had until May 20, 2024, to appeal. Oslund filed on June 20, explaining that he had been evicted, was temporarily homeless, and did not receive the notice until after the deadline. An unemployment law judge dismissed the appeal as untimely, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Court’s Holding
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Under the version of Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f), applicable to Oslund’s determination, an ineligibility determination became final unless appealed within 20 calendar days after it was sent. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(c), required an unemployment law judge to dismiss an appeal filed outside that period.
The court held that the statute gave the unemployment law judge no discretion to consider an applicant’s explanation for a late appeal or create an equitable exception. A hearing may be held to resolve a factual dispute about when the determination was sent or the appeal filed, but Oslund conceded his filing was late. The court did not address possible constitutional or other legal challenges to the deadline’s finality.
Key Takeaways
- An untimely appeal from an unemployment-benefit ineligibility determination must be dismissed under the applicable statutes.
- A ULJ may examine facts bearing on whether an appeal was timely, but may not excuse a conceded late filing based on homelessness, delayed receipt, or other mitigating circumstances.
- The court relied on the statutes’ mandatory language and its prior decision in Semanko.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that the statutory deadline for appealing an unemployment ineligibility determination is rigid at the administrative level. Claimants and counsel must act within the statutory period measured from DEED’s sending of the determination, not its receipt.
The ruling also leaves any change to allow good-cause exceptions to the Legislature, while expressly reserving questions about constitutional and other challenges to the deadline.