Background
Before the medically induced delivery of her third child, Shani Brown signed a form authorizing a vaginal delivery with possible laceration or episiotomy repairs and a possible cesarean section. According to Brown’s sworn complaint, her labor progressed rapidly and she lacked adequate pain relief. As the baby’s head was crowning, Dr. Barbara Davey-Sullivan announced that she would perform an episiotomy. Brown said “no” and pleaded, “please don’t cut me,” but the doctor performed the procedure.
Brown sued Dr. Davey-Sullivan and The Woman’s Clinic of Mississippi, PLLC, asserting lack of informed consent and battery, among other claims against several defendants. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the episiotomy-related claims because Brown produced no medical expert testimony. After the remaining claims were resolved, Brown timely appealed the summary-judgment ruling. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that it had appellate jurisdiction despite Brown’s failure to designate the final dismissal order in her notice of appeal because she filed within thirty days after the challenged interlocutory ruling became final and her intent was clear.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on the informed-consent claim. Such a claim sounds in medical negligence and requires expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care and its breach. Brown offered no expert testimony during discovery, in response to summary judgment, or with her motion for reconsideration.
The Court also held that expert testimony was required for Brown’s medical-battery claim. Adopting the approach of Mims v. Boland, the Court held that when a patient initially consents but withdraws consent after a procedure is underway, the patient must show both that consent was withdrawn and that the physician could have stopped or refrained from the procedure without endangering the patient’s health or life. Because the delivery implicated the safety of both Brown and her infant, Brown needed medical expert testimony showing that the child could have been delivered safely without an episiotomy. Her failure to provide that testimony warranted summary judgment and also supported the alternative ruling that she failed to attach the statutorily required certificate of expert consultation.
Key Takeaways
- A wholly unconsented-to medical procedure may support a battery claim without expert testimony, but this case involved consent given before delivery and allegedly withdrawn while delivery was underway.
- A patient asserting battery based on withdrawn consent must present medical evidence that stopping or avoiding the procedure was medically feasible and would not endanger the patient or, when applicable, another patient such as an infant being delivered.
- Brown’s words could establish that she withdrew consent, but expert testimony was necessary to establish that the episiotomy was medically unnecessary and could safely have been avoided.
Why It Matters
The decision establishes Mississippi’s framework for medical-battery claims involving consent withdrawn during an ongoing procedure. It distinguishes those claims from cases involving no consent at all and makes medical feasibility a required, expert-supported element when a physician’s decision to continue implicates patient safety.
The ruling also confirms that a notice of appeal filed after final judgment may obtain review of a specifically designated interlocutory order even if the notice does not separately designate the later order that made the case final, when the appellant’s intent is clear and the appellee is not misled.