Background
A DeSoto County grand jury indicted Justin Alexzander Geantt on five drug counts. Count 4 alleged that he possessed with intent to sell, transfer, distribute, or dispense forty or more dosage units of fentanyl in violation of Mississippi Code section 41-29-139(f). Represented by counsel, Geantt pleaded guilty to that count in exchange for the State remanding the other four counts. The circuit court sentenced him to twelve years in custody followed by seven years of post-release supervision.
After two earlier post-conviction-relief motions were denied, Geantt filed a third motion. He argued that his trafficking conviction and sentence were illegal because he believed he had been indicted only for possession with intent to sell fentanyl, and he alleged that counsel was ineffective for permitting the plea, failing to present his drug-use history as evidence of personal use, and allowing him to plead guilty under an invalid indictment. The circuit court dismissed the motion under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act as successive and without merit.
The Court’s Holding
The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. Under Mississippi Code section 99-39-23(6), an order denying or dismissing a post-conviction motion generally bars a second or successive motion. Because this was Geantt’s third motion and he did not establish any statutory exception to the successive-motions bar, the circuit court properly dismissed it.
The court also held that Geantt’s claims lacked merit. Count 4 expressly cited section 41-29-139(f), identified fentanyl, and alleged forty or more dosage units—the statutory elements supporting the trafficking charge. Although the capias described the offense as possession with intent to sell fentanyl, the indictment controlled. Geantt’s signed plea petition, plea-hearing statements, and sentencing documents showed that he had notice of the trafficking charge and knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to it. McCarty and Emfinger, JJ., concurred in part and in the result without separate written opinion; the remaining participating judges concurred.
Key Takeaways
- A prior order denying or dismissing post-conviction relief bars a successive motion unless the movant proves that a statutory exception applies.
- An indictment alleging possession with intent to transfer forty or more dosage units of fentanyl under section 41-29-139(f) properly charges trafficking.
- The indictment—not a capias’s abbreviated description—controlled the charge, and the plea record established that Geantt knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to trafficking.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces Mississippi’s strict limitation on successive post-conviction motions: repackaging challenges to an indictment, sentence, or counsel’s performance does not overcome the statutory bar without a recognized exception.
It also illustrates how courts assess notice and voluntariness by examining the indictment and the entire plea record. A shorthand offense description in another document will not invalidate a plea when the indictment, signed petition, and plea colloquy consistently identify the actual charge.