Background
Louise Gombako-Amos and Corey Rene Amos divorced in August 2019 on irreconcilable-differences grounds. Their property settlement agreement (PSA), incorporated into the divorce judgment, required Louise to assume responsibility for a Trustmark National Bank judgment against both parties and to hold Corey harmless from any liability on it. Beginning in February 2021, Trustmark satisfied the debt by garnishing Louise’s salary each month; by April 2022 it had collected $51,480.34 from her wages, leaving roughly $50,518 still owed.
In March 2022, Corey contracted to sell a New Orleans property he had received under the PSA. He learned at closing that the Trustmark judgment had been enrolled as a lien against that property and paid the remaining $50,518.33 out of closing proceeds to clear title. Corey did not notify Louise that the lien existed or that he had paid it. Louise, for her part, received a call from Trustmark in April 2022 advising that the judgment had been released, but—unaware that Corey had sold his property or paid the balance—she believed the bank had simply forgiven the residual amount given how much she had already paid through garnishment.
In June 2022, Corey filed a complaint for contempt in Pike County Chancery Court. After a hearing, the chancellor found Louise in “willful contumacious contempt,” ordered her to pay Corey $50,518.32 plus five-percent interest within ninety days, and awarded Corey $4,000 in attorneys’ fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Louise petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
The Court’s Holding
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the contempt finding and the attorneys’ fee award, and remanded for the chancery court to determine the appropriate time and manner for Louise to reimburse Corey. Writing for the en banc majority, Justice Griffis held that clear and convincing evidence of a willful and deliberate violation of a court order—the standard required for civil contempt—was not present. Louise had been actively complying with the PSA by paying the Trustmark judgment through court-ordered garnishment; she had no knowledge that Corey had paid off the judgment or that a lien encumbered his property, and her testimony that she believed the bank had excused the residual balance was unrebutted as to willfulness.
The Court also held that the PSA was vague as to how Louise was required to satisfy the Trustmark debt in order to hold Corey harmless. The agreement did not specify a lump-sum payment, a payment timeline, or any procedure to follow if Corey voluntarily paid the judgment himself. Because a contempt finding requires that the underlying order be clear and complete, the ambiguity in the PSA provided an independent basis to reject the contempt holding. The Court distinguished Louise’s obligation to reimburse Corey—which it acknowledged exists—from the separate and unmet requirement that her failure to do so be willful and deliberate before contempt may be imposed.
Because the attorneys’ fee award rested entirely on the contempt finding, it was reversed and rendered. The case was remanded for the chancery court to fashion an appropriate reimbursement schedule, acknowledging that Louise does owe Corey the $50,518.33 he paid at closing.
Key Takeaways
- Civil contempt in Mississippi requires clear and convincing evidence of a willful and deliberate violation of a court order; a party who is actively complying with a judgment (here, through ongoing garnishment) and lacks notice that circumstances have changed cannot be found in willful contempt.
- A hold-harmless clause in a PSA that does not specify the form, timing, or procedure for reimbursement is too vague to support a contempt finding when a novel triggering event—such as the other party’s voluntary payoff of the debt—arises without notice to the obligated party.
- Attorneys’ fees awarded on the basis of a contempt finding fall with that finding; because the contempt was reversed, the fee award was reversed and rendered as well.
- A party’s exercise of the right to raise affirmative defenses in a contempt proceeding does not itself constitute willful refusal to comply with a court order.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that the willfulness requirement for civil contempt is not a formality—courts must examine what the alleged contemnor actually knew and intended before imposing the serious consequences that a contempt adjudication carries. Practitioners drafting PSAs should take note: a hold-harmless provision that is silent on payment mechanics, timing, and contingencies (such as one party voluntarily assuming a shared debt) may be unenforceable through contempt, even when the underlying financial obligation is undisputed.
The case also highlights the procedural stakes of communication between divorced parties. Corey’s decision to pay off the Trustmark judgment at closing without notifying Louise—and to proceed directly to a contempt action two months later—was a significant factor in the Court’s willfulness analysis. Attorneys advising clients who hold harmless agreements in divorce decrees should counsel prompt, documented communication whenever circumstances change, both to preserve contempt remedies and to avoid the kind of evidentiary gap that derailed enforcement here.