Background
In September 2025, the Missouri General Assembly enacted House Bill No. 1 (“HB 1”), which repealed existing congressional districts established in 2022 and drew new ones despite the absence of a new census certification to the governor. HB 1 carried an effective date of December 11, 2025. Referendum petition organizers submitted 691 boxes of signed petitions to the Missouri Secretary of State on December 9, 2025—two days before the law was set to take effect—and received a box receipt and a referendum receipt form that same day. The Secretary had not, however, issued a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency under § 116.150, and his statutory deadline to do so had not yet passed.
Two qualified Missouri voters who had signed the petition—Jake Maggard and Gregg Lombardi—filed suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of Cole County. They argued that HB 1 was automatically suspended the moment the referendum petition was filed on December 9 under article III, sections 49, 52(a), and 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution, and that §§ 116.130 and 116.150 were unconstitutional to the extent they allowed the Secretary to delay that suspension pending signature verification. The circuit court rejected their claims on multiple grounds, including lack of standing, ripeness, and the merits, holding HB 1 was not automatically suspended. Appellants appealed, and the Missouri Supreme Court accepted transfer on its own motion.
A companion case, Luther v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc 2026), had already resolved a separate challenge, holding HB 1 did not violate article III, section 45 because that provision obligates redistricting upon census certification but does not otherwise limit the General Assembly’s plenary power over congressional districts.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, affirmed the circuit court, holding unanimously that the mere physical delivery of referendum petitions does not automatically suspend a legislative act under article III, sections 49, 52(a), or 52(b) of the Missouri Constitution. The Court grounded its decision in the plain text of those provisions, none of which uses the words “suspend” or “suspension.” Section 52(a) conditions a valid referendum on petitions “signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts”—a signature requirement that must actually be satisfied before any measure is “referred to the people” and before section 52(b)’s take-effect-only-upon-voter-approval language is triggered. Accepting appellants’ argument, the Court reasoned, would allow boxes of blank paper or invalid signatures to automatically freeze duly enacted legislation, an absurd result inconsistent with the constitutional text.
The Court distinguished its 1914 precedent, State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter, 165 S.W. 773 (Mo. banc 1914), which had stated that filing a “legal, sufficient, and timely” petition suspends the challenged act. Kemper involved an admittedly sufficient petition and was decided before Missouri’s statutory certification framework (chapter 116, effective January 1, 1981) existed. The Court held that the question of sufficiency must be finally resolved through the chapter 116 process—including the Secretary’s review under §§ 116.120–116.150 and any judicial review under § 116.200—before it can be determined whether the December 9 filing was “legal, sufficient, and timely.”
The Court further held there is no as-applied constitutional conflict between article III, sections 49, 52(a), and 52(b) and the statutory certification provisions, §§ 116.130 and 116.150, because chapter 116 does not override the Constitution—it implements it. Critically, the Court explained that if the petition is ultimately certified as sufficient, the Secretary’s certification relates back to December 9, meaning HB 1 never took effect and can only become law if voters approve it. If the petition is ultimately found insufficient, HB 1 became law on December 11, 2025, as originally scheduled.
Key Takeaways
- Physical delivery of referendum petition boxes does not, by itself, automatically suspend a Missouri law; suspension requires a “legal, sufficient, and timely” petition as measured by the constitutional signature requirement in article III, section 52(a).
- A measure is not “referred to the people” under article III, section 52(b) until the signature threshold is satisfied—the Secretary’s chapter 116 certification process, once complete, relates back to the filing date to determine whether the law ever took effect.
- Sections 116.130 and 116.150, which vest signature-verification authority in the Secretary of State, are not unconstitutional as applied here; they implement rather than conflict with the referendum provisions of the Missouri Constitution.
- The 1914 Kemper decision does not control where sufficiency is disputed and where the modern statutory certification framework—enacted in 1981 and significantly amended since—governs the verification process.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a high-stakes dispute over Missouri’s 2025 congressional redistricting law during an active signature-verification period, but its significance extends well beyond HB 1. By holding that automatic suspension requires a constitutionally sufficient petition—not merely boxes of paper delivered to the Secretary—the Court clarifies the interplay between Missouri’s direct-democracy provisions and the statutory certification infrastructure that has governed referendum petitions for more than four decades. Campaigns seeking to suspend controversial legislation through referendum can no longer treat the submission date as the moment legal suspension begins; that status depends on ultimate verification of the signature requirement.
Practically, the ruling leaves the fate of HB 1’s congressional map contingent on the outcome of ongoing signature verification. The parties acknowledged the statutory deadline for a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency is August 4, 2026. If the petition is ultimately certified sufficient, the map cannot take effect without voter approval at the next general election; if it is found insufficient, the 2025 redistricting stands. Either way, the Court’s relate-back framework—borrowed from Kemper and a Nebraska Supreme Court analogy cited in footnote 15—provides a workable mechanism for resolving the retroactive question of when, if ever, a contested law became operative.