Background
Daryl Clemmons regularly attended his young son’s football games where the victim served as the team’s volunteer coach. In October 2023, the two argued after a game when Clemmons’ son was kept out of the starting lineup; another coach intervened before the confrontation became physical. Nine days later, at a subsequent practice, the victim approached Clemmons in the parking lot intending to fight him, having handed his own firearm to a nearby parent beforehand. As the victim advanced, Clemmons drew his own gun. The victim then froze, turned, and began running away — at which point Clemmons opened fire, striking the victim four times, including after the victim had already fallen to the ground.
The State charged Clemmons with Assault in the First Degree (a Class A felony) and Armed Criminal Action (ACA). The State offered a plea deal calling for the minimum sentence on each count — ten years for assault and three years for ACA — which Clemmons rejected. At trial Clemmons testified he fired only after the victim attempted to retrieve his gun from the parent holding it; the victim testified he was unarmed when shot and was fleeing when Clemmons fired. The jury convicted on both counts. After the verdict, Clemmons waived jury sentencing and entered into a sentencing agreement with the State for the same minimums he had earlier been offered. The trial court sentenced him to ten years and three years consecutively.
Clemmons appealed on three grounds: (1) the State failed to disprove lawful self-defense, entitling him to acquittal; (2) the trial court mistakenly believed probation and suspended sentences were unavailable for first-degree assault; and (3) the jury, not the court, was required under section 557.045 to find that the offense involved a deadly weapon before that provision’s sentencing restrictions could apply.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed on all three points. On the sufficiency-of-evidence claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could find Clemmons did not act in lawful self-defense. Under Missouri law, deadly force is justified only when the defendant reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death, serious physical injury, or a forcible felony — and self-defense does not apply once the victim is in retreat. The victim’s testimony that he was unarmed, was fleeing when first shot, and was shot again after falling to the ground provided ample basis for the jury to reject the self-defense claim.
On Points Two and Three, which Clemmons conceded were unpreserved, the court declined to exercise plain error review. The court reasoned there was no facially evident, obvious, or clear error because the sentence did not flow from any legal misunderstanding by the trial court — it flowed from Clemmons’ own voluntary waiver of jury sentencing and his agreed-upon sentencing arrangement. A defendant may, by waiving jury sentencing and entering a sentencing agreement, relieve the State of its obligation under Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), and Apprendi v. New Jersey to have a jury find sentencing-enhancement facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court noted that by agreeing to the minimum sentence, Clemmons had strategically avoided the risk of the jury recommending up to thirty years on the assault conviction plus a consecutive ACA term — the same minimums he had previously declined in the pretrial plea offer.
Key Takeaways
- Missouri self-defense law does not justify deadly force once the victim has turned and is in retreat; continuing to shoot a fleeing or downed victim takes the conduct outside the scope of lawful self-defense.
- A defendant who voluntarily waives jury sentencing and agrees to a specific sentence forfeits the Apprendi/Erlinger right to have a jury find sentencing-enhancement facts — including whether the offense involved use of a deadly weapon under section 557.045.
- On plain error review, a defendant must show an error that is facially evident, obvious, and clear; where the sentence is the product of the defendant’s own valid agreement, no such error exists regardless of what the trial court may or may not have believed about its sentencing options.
- The armed criminal action statute (section 571.015) independently bars probation and requires the ACA sentence to run consecutive to the underlying offense sentence, reinforcing the mandatory prison exposure Clemmons faced.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates how Missouri’s self-defense doctrine draws a hard line at retreat: once a victim turns and flees — and certainly once he is on the ground — the justification for deadly force evaporates as a matter of law, leaving the question of reasonableness squarely for the jury. Defense attorneys in Missouri must frame their self-defense arguments around the precise moment force was used, not the initial provocation.
The case also offers a practical lesson on sentencing strategy. By agreeing to a capped sentence before jury deliberations on punishment, Clemmons simultaneously waived his Apprendi-based argument that a jury must find the deadly-weapon enhancement fact. Courts will hold defendants to such bargains: having traded the risk of a much longer jury-recommended sentence for a guaranteed minimum, Clemmons could not later use plain error review to undo the arrangement on constitutional grounds.