Background
A man robbed a victim at gunpoint inside his Crestwood home, taking cash, firearms, keys, and the victim’s vehicle. More than a year later, St. Louis police arrested Raymond Hardge on outstanding warrants after stopping a vehicle reportedly connected to an attempted abduction. An officer decided to tow the vehicle and began an inventory search, finding a Colt .38 special in the glove compartment. Hardge’s girlfriend then arrived and took possession of the vehicle, so it was not ultimately towed.
The State charged Hardge with first-degree robbery. While in federal custody, he requested disposition of the Missouri charge under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Trial was initially set within the IAD’s 180-day period, but Hardge first requested a continuance and later, after new counsel entered five days before the rescheduled trial, asked that the case be removed from the trial docket. The circuit court denied his motions to dismiss under the IAD and to suppress evidence from the inventory search. A jury convicted him, and the court sentenced him to 30 years in prison.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Hardge waived his right to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period. His initial continuance request tolled the deadline, and his later request to remove the case from the trial docket altogether constituted willing acceptance of treatment inconsistent with the IAD’s time limits. The trial court therefore properly denied his motion to dismiss.
The court held that Hardge did not preserve his inventory-search claim because his point relied on challenged only the interlocutory denial of his suppression motion and did not identify the evidence allegedly admitted in error. The court declined discretionary plain-error review because Hardge failed to show facially substantial grounds for believing an evident, obvious, and clear error caused manifest injustice.
The court added that the officer began the inventory pursuant to department policy after deciding to tow a vehicle that otherwise would have remained at a busy intersection. The officer’s failure to complete tow-related paperwork or obtain approvals did not establish plain error because the vehicle was released to Hardge’s girlfriend instead of being towed.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant may waive the IAD’s 180-day trial protection by requesting that a case be removed from the trial docket.
- A point relied on that challenges only the denial of a suppression motion and fails to identify the disputed trial evidence preserves nothing for appellate review.
- An inventory search begun under standardized towing procedures is not necessarily invalid merely because the vehicle is later released and never towed.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that IAD protections can be lost through defense counsel’s scheduling requests, even when new counsel reasonably needs additional preparation time. A request to remove a case from the trial docket may constitute waiver rather than merely tolling the statutory period.
It also illustrates Missouri’s strict preservation rules for suppression issues. Appellants must challenge the admission of specifically identified evidence at trial, not merely the earlier denial of a motion to suppress, and must establish facial grounds for relief before an appellate court will undertake discretionary plain-error review.