Background
Christine Brock, as co-trustee of a family trust, claimed a right to use Forgotten Lane across property owned by Shan and Dana Tompkins. Brock initially alleged that a 1987 certificate of survey created an express easement benefiting her two parcels. After the District Court denied the parties’ competing summary-judgment motions, it permitted Brock to amend her complaint to add implied-, prescriptive-, and public-easement theories. The Tompkins counterclaimed for trespass and asserted extinguishment defenses.
The District Court bifurcated the case, assigning the express-, implied-, and public-easement theories to the court while reserving Brock’s prescriptive-easement claim and the Tompkins’ trespass counterclaim for a jury if necessary. Following a bench trial, the court rejected the express-easement theory but found an implied easement by preexisting use benefiting both Brock parcels, adopted the 60-foot-wide corridor and utility rights depicted on the 1987 survey, and entered a permanent injunction. It later dismissed the remaining claims and issues as moot and ruled that Brock’s statutory request for costs and attorney fees was untimely.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court held that the Tompkins were entitled to summary judgment on Brock’s original express-easement theory because neither the 1987 survey nor any conveyance identified either Brock parcel as the dominant estate or granted Brock a right to use the corridor. The Court nevertheless affirmed the order allowing amendment because it was entered before judgment and did not unduly prejudice the Tompkins. It also affirmed the denial of the converted motion for judgment on the pleadings, the later partial-summary-judgment ruling on the unresolved amended theories, and the bifurcation order, while directing the District Court to preserve all applicable jury-trial rights on remand.
The Court reversed the implied-easement judgment because the District Court did not separately identify an operative severance or establish every element of an implied easement by clear and convincing evidence for each Brock parcel. The later survey also could not establish the severing parties’ earlier intent or independently support the easement’s 60-foot width, full-road length, and utility rights. Because Brock already received a full trial on implied easement by preexisting use, that theory does not return on remand.
The Court vacated the permanent injunction and the mootness dismissals of Brock’s prescriptive-easement claim, the Tompkins’ trespass counterclaim, and the extinguishment issues. It remanded any preserved alternative easement theory not adjudicated on the merits, including any preserved public-easement theory. The Court also held that Brock timely filed her cost memorandum after the June 19 final judgment and remanded her request under Sections 25-7-105 and 25-10-501, MCA, for a new determination after final judgment on the remanded claims; it left undisturbed the separate denial of fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
Key Takeaways
- A survey depicting an easement does not create an express easement unless the relevant instruments manifest an intent to grant the right and identify the dominant and servient estates with reasonable certainty.
- An implied easement by preexisting use requires parcel-specific, severance-specific proof of apparent and continuous use, reasonable necessity, and intent to continue the use, all by clear and convincing evidence.
- When findings and conclusions expressly leave claims and further proceedings unresolved, they do not trigger Montana’s five-day deadline for filing a memorandum of costs.
Why It Matters
The decision emphasizes that courts cannot infer a single easement for parcels with different chains of title without tracing the alleged servient and dominant estates to an operative severance and proving every required element for each parcel. A later-recorded survey cannot substitute for evidence of the use and intent existing when ownership was severed.
The ruling also clarifies the procedural consequences of reversing the theory that supplied complete relief: alternative claims and counterclaims dismissed as moot may return, jury rights must be reassessed, and statutory costs and attorney fees must be evaluated against the new final judgment ultimately entered on remand.