Brock v. Tompkins — Montana Supreme Court reverses implied easement and remands remaining access claims

Case
Christine Brock, as Co-Trustee of the Don and Janet Brock Family Trust v. Shan and Dana Tompkins
Court
Montana Supreme Court
Judge
Katherine M. Bidegaray (elected 2024)
Date Decided
August 4, 2026
Docket No.
DA 25-0436
Topics
Implied easements; Property access; Civil procedure; Attorney fees
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Christine Brock, acting as co-trustee of a family trust, claimed access over Forgotten Lane, a roadway crossing Shan and Dana Tompkins’ Ravalli County property. Brock owns two parcels south of the Tompkins parcel: a 2.5-acre residence parcel and a separate Hoofbeats Lane parcel. The properties trace to historic common ownership, but their title histories diverged through multiple conveyances and later subdivisions.

Brock originally sued in 2018 on the theory that a 1987 certificate of survey expressly created an easement. After the District Court denied both sides’ initial summary-judgment motions and permitted amendment, Brock added implied-, prescriptive-, and public-easement theories. Following a bench trial, the District Court rejected the express-easement theory but declared that Brock had an implied easement across the entire Forgotten Lane corridor, entered a permanent injunction, and treated other claims and defenses as moot.

The Court’s Holding

The Montana Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in finding an implied easement by preexisting use. Brock had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, an operative severance of common ownership, an apparent and continuous preexisting use serving each claimed dominant parcel, reasonable necessity, and intent for the use to continue. The District Court instead relied on one 1950 severance without separately establishing the required elements for Brock’s two parcels, which had different title chains and possible severance dates.

The Court also held that the 1987 survey could not establish the necessary intent at a 1950, 1976, or 1978 severance, nor justify the judgment’s 60-foot width, utility rights, and full-road scope. It reversed the implied-easement judgment, vacated the permanent injunction and mootness dismissals, and remanded preserved alternative easement theories, the prescriptive-easement claim, trespass counterclaim, and extinguishment issues. It affirmed the allowance of Brock’s amended complaint and the bifurcation order, while holding that Brock’s cost memorandum was timely because the March 2025 order was not final.

Key Takeaways

  • An implied easement by preexisting use must be proved separately for each claimed dominant parcel and operative severance.
  • A later survey cannot by itself prove the parties’ intent at the time of severance or expand an implied easement’s scope.
  • Reversal of the judgment supplying complete relief revives claims and defenses the trial court dismissed as moot.

Why It Matters

The decision underscores that implied-easement claims require title-specific and parcel-specific proof, not generalized evidence of historic road use. Evidence that a road was treated as public does not alone establish a private appurtenant easement.

On remand, the District Court must identify the live claims and defenses, reconsider case sequencing, and preserve applicable jury-trial rights. It must also decide any recoverable statutory costs and attorney fees after a new final judgment.

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