Background
Kris Hawkins, a self-represented litigant acting on behalf of herself and as trustee of the Olson Trust, sued NorthWestern Energy in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court (Ravalli County) in March 2024. She alleged that Northwestern improperly provided utility services to two parcels of real property purportedly owned by the Olson Trust, and asserted a wide range of claims including negligence, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting criminal activity, actual fraud, violations of the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also named the law firm Rhoades & Erickson, PLLC as a defendant because it represented third parties occupying one of the parcels and had sent Hawkins a settlement letter. The district court ultimately dismissed Rhoades from the case in July 2024.
The litigation was further complicated by a judicial disqualification dispute. In October 2024, Hawkins moved to disqualify the presiding judge, Judge Recht, alleging ex parte communications with opposing counsel. Judge Recht denied the motion as procedurally defective. Hawkins then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, which was rendered moot when Judge Kaydee Snipes Ruiz assumed jurisdiction upon Judge Recht’s invitation in January 2025. Meanwhile, in September 2024, Northwestern filed a second motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and a scheduling order had set December 1, 2024 as the deadline to join additional parties.
In February 2025, Hawkins filed a “Joinder of Party Plaintiff” seeking to add Terry Wallace, whom she identified as a co-trustee of the Olson Trust, as a plaintiff — well after the scheduling order deadline. Hawkins did not file a response brief opposing Northwestern’s second motion to dismiss. On April 24, 2025, the district court dismissed the entire case under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c) based on Hawkins’s failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, and denied joinder of Wallace as untimely and insufficiently supported.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the district court’s April 24, 2025 order in full. On the disqualification issue, the Court held that Hawkins waived her challenge to Judge Snipes Ruiz’s assumption of jurisdiction by failing to raise any objection until the appeal — she knew from the outset that Judge Snipes Ruiz had accepted the case upon Judge Recht’s invitation, yet never objected in the district court within a reasonable time, as required under Montana law.
On dismissal, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming Northwestern’s second motion to dismiss “well taken” under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c) after Hawkins failed to file a response brief. The Court further held that the district court did not err in considering the second Rule 12(b)(6) motion despite Northwestern’s initial Rule 12 motion having omitted that defense, because M. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) expressly preserves the failure-to-state-a-claim defense beyond the initial Rule 12 motion, and addressing the motion on the merits would have promoted judicial economy. The Court also found no error in the district court’s refusal to convert the motion to a summary judgment motion, since the outside materials Northwestern referenced had no bearing on the grounds for dismissal.
On the joinder issue, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to add Wallace as a plaintiff. Hawkins’s attempt to join Wallace in February 2025 was untimely under the September 2024 scheduling order, and she failed to show good cause under M. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) to modify that deadline. The Court also noted that Northwestern had presented information showing Wallace had been declared a vexatious litigant by the Montana Supreme Court and had been suspended from practicing law in Montana, factors supporting the district court’s conclusion that joinder would impede orderly resolution of the case.
Key Takeaways
- Under Montana Uniform District Court Rule 2(c), a party’s failure to file a response brief to a motion to dismiss permits the district court to deem the motion well taken and grant dismissal — the district court’s exercise of that discretion will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.
- A Rule 12(b)(6) failure-to-state-a-claim defense is not waived by omission from an initial Rule 12 motion; M. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) expressly allows it to be raised later, and a district court may consider a successive Rule 12(b)(6) motion where doing so promotes judicial economy.
- Challenges to a judge’s assumption of jurisdiction — including procedural objections and impartiality concerns short of actual bias or prejudice — are subject to waiver if not raised within a reasonable time in the trial court; raising such a challenge for the first time on appeal is too late.
- A scheduling order deadline for joinder of parties survives a change in the presiding judge; the new judge is bound by the existing order and may modify it only upon a showing of good cause under M. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).
- This is a noncitable memorandum opinion under Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules and does not serve as precedent.
Why It Matters
This case illustrates the procedural pitfalls facing self-represented litigants in complex civil litigation. Hawkins’s losses on the disqualification challenge, the motion-to-dismiss ruling, and the joinder request all turned on procedural defaults — failing to timely object, failing to file a response brief, and failing to meet a scheduling deadline — rather than on the underlying merits of her claims. For practitioners, the opinion reinforces that Montana’s preservation rules apply with equal force to pro se litigants and that a party who sits on a known procedural objection forfeits it.
The Court’s treatment of the successive Rule 12(b)(6) motion is also noteworthy for litigators: while Rule 12(g)(2) generally bars a second Rule 12 motion raising defenses available but omitted from the first, the Court confirmed that the failure-to-state-a-claim defense occupies a special carve-out under Rule 12(h)(2) and may be entertained later in the proceeding where judicial economy favors doing so. Defense counsel should keep this tool available even after an initial Rule 12 motion is filed.