Background
Taralyn and Dean DeCock divorced after a fifteen-year marriage. During March 2024 mediation, the parties signed a Marital and Property Distribution Agreement (MPSA) resolving all property issues. The MPSA assigned Dean the bulk of his retirement accounts—collectively worth well over $1 million—while Taralyn received her own accounts plus $139,000 and $15,000 transfers from two of Dean’s accounts, for a total she later valued at roughly $329,350. The agreement expressly recited that all assets had been disclosed, that each party waived final financial disclosures, and that the division was fair and equitable. Taralyn signed the agreement and, months later, executed a joint affidavit again attesting under oath that the MPSA was not unconscionable and requesting the court incorporate it into a final decree—which the District Court did on February 25, 2025.
Shortly after mediation, Taralyn retained new counsel and moved to rescind the MPSA, arguing it was unconscionable because her original attorney had never shared Dean’s financial disclosures with her before mediation. The District Court denied that motion, noting the MPSA itself referenced Dean’s retirement assets by name and that Taralyn had attested to reading and approving the agreement. Taralyn did not timely appeal the final decree. Instead, 121 days after entry of the decree, she filed a motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) arguing her former counsel’s gross neglect constituted an extraordinary circumstance warranting post-judgment relief. The District Court never ruled on the motion; it was deemed denied by default on August 25, 2025. Taralyn appealed four days later.
Because Taralyn’s notice of appeal came 185 days after the final decree—well outside the 30-day window under M. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i)—the Montana Supreme Court limited its review to the sole timely issue: whether the deemed denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was an abuse of discretion.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taralyn’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion on two independent grounds. First, the motion was an impermissible substitute for appeal. Rule 60(b)(6)—the catch-all provision—requires extraordinary circumstances beyond those addressed by the rule’s first five subsections and cannot be used merely to relitigate issues already decided. The court found that Taralyn’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion rested on the same facts and the same legal theory as her earlier motion to rescind: that her attorney’s conduct caused her to sign an unconscionable agreement without knowing the true value of Dean’s retirement assets. Recasting identical facts under the label of “attorney gross neglect” rather than “unconscionability” did not transform the motion into something warranting extraordinary relief.
Second, even setting aside the relitigation problem, Taralyn could not satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)’s independent requirement that the movant be blameless as to the circumstances underlying the judgment. The court emphasized that the final decree was entered on February 25, 2025—one day after Taralyn filed a joint affidavit in which she, with full knowledge of Dean’s assets, swore under penalty of perjury that the MPSA was fair, equitable, and not unconscionable, and expressly requested the court adopt it. Having deliberately invited the decree she now seeks to undo, Taralyn could not claim she was wronged through no fault of her own. The court analogized to prior decisions holding clients not blameless even when their attorneys made errors, where the clients’ own conduct contributed to the adverse judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute for a timely appeal; a movant cannot escape the finality of a judgment simply by reframing the same underlying facts and legal theory under a different procedural label.
- To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a movant must independently demonstrate both extraordinary circumstances and personal blamelessness as to the circumstances giving rise to the judgment—not merely blamelessness as to the attorney’s alleged misconduct.
- A party who, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, executes a sworn affidavit attesting that a settlement agreement is fair and equitable and affirmatively requests the court adopt it will face a very high bar in later challenging that same decree as the product of attorney neglect.
- In Montana dissolution proceedings, property settlement terms adopted by both parties carry a strong presumption of finality, and courts will not disturb them absent compelling injustice showing unconscionability under § 40-4-201(2), MCA.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the finality of negotiated marital settlement agreements in Montana and underscores the critical importance of perfecting a timely direct appeal when a party believes a dissolution decree is erroneous. Attorneys advising clients in post-decree proceedings must appreciate that Rule 60(b)(6) is a narrow remedy reserved for circumstances genuinely beyond a party’s control—not a second chance to relitigate issues lost at the trial court level.
The opinion also signals that courts will look holistically at a party’s post-agreement conduct when assessing blamelessness. A client who continues to ratify a settlement—particularly through sworn filings—well after learning of the alleged attorney failure cannot later claim the resulting judgment was entered without fault on her part. This has practical implications for malpractice strategy: a client who wants to preserve a Rule 60 challenge must be careful not to take affirmative steps that confirm or invite the very judgment she may later seek to vacate.