Background
Clark Ramsey and Whitney Soderholm married in 2008 and moved from Virginia to Montana in April 2019. They have three children. After Ramsey filed for dissolution in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, in February 2020—when both parties and all three children were living in Montana—the District Court ruled that Soderholm and the children could move back to Virginia. The court conducted a three-day bench trial in 2022 and entered a Final Parenting Plan granting Soderholm primary physical custody in Virginia, with Ramsey having regular parenting time in both states.
In July 2024, the Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations (JDR) Court registered the Montana Final Parenting Plan. In September 2024, Ramsey separately petitioned the Virginia JDR Court for an order of protection based on allegations that Soderholm was using corporal punishment on the children. The Virginia JDR Court entered a protective order prohibiting corporal punishment and requiring Soderholm to attend parenting classes, but did not remove the children from her custody. Ramsey also moved the Virginia JDR Court to modify child custody arrangements. In response, the Virginia JDR Court issued an order in December 2024 staying the custody modification proceedings pending the Montana court’s resolution of Ramsey’s Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction.
On November 25, 2024, Ramsey filed a Verified Motion to Surrender Jurisdiction in the Montana District Court, arguing that it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)—enacted in Montana as Title 40, chapter 7, MCA—and that Montana was an inconvenient forum under § 40-7-108, MCA. The District Court held a hearing in June 2025 and denied the motion. Ramsey appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The opinion addressed three principal arguments.
First, the Court agreed that the District Court clearly erred in finding that no pending custody proceeding existed in Virginia. The Virginia JDR Court’s December 2024 stay order plainly established that Ramsey’s motion to modify child custody was pending before it. But this error was harmless because the District Court’s alternative jurisdictional analysis was correct: under § 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA, a Montana court retains jurisdiction over a child custody determination until a court determines that neither the child, a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in Montana. Ramsey himself resided in Montana, which was undisputed. That independent basis for retained jurisdiction was properly applied.
Second, on Ramsey’s argument that the District Court should have analyzed the “significant connection” test of § 40-7-202(1)(a), MCA, the Court held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the substance of the argument Ramsey actually made. Ramsey’s briefing focused exclusively on § 40-7-202(1)(b) and the domicile of Soderholm and the children in Virginia; he never adequately briefed the significant-connection and substantial-evidence inquiry that § 40-7-202(1)(a) requires. A court need not construct a party’s legal argument for them.
Third, on inconvenient forum under § 40-7-108(2), MCA, the District Court was not required to expressly address every factor in the statute if the unconsidered factors were immaterial to its conclusion. The same judge had presided over the entire case, conducted a three-day trial, and issued a comprehensive Final Parenting Plan. The District Court’s familiarity with the matter and its demonstrated ability to expeditiously resolve custody issues were properly weighed. The Court distinguished Stoneman v. Drollinger—where serious documented domestic violence made the victim’s home state a potentially better forum for protection—because the Virginia protective order here involved only a prohibition on corporal punishment and did not reflect the type of escalating serious violence at issue in Stoneman. The Court also noted that Ramsey’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction came at a time when circumstances were “virtually identical” to those that existed when the original Final Parenting Plan was entered, raising forum-shopping concerns that the UCCJEA is designed to discourage.
Key Takeaways
- A Montana court retains UCCJEA jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(b), MCA, as long as either party—including the party seeking to transfer jurisdiction—presently resides in Montana; the other parent and children living out of state does not by itself divest the Montana court of jurisdiction.
- A movant seeking to divest a Montana court of UCCJEA jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(a) (the significant-connection test) must actually brief the required elements—demonstrating that neither the child nor either parent has a significant connection with Montana and that substantial evidence is no longer available here; merely arguing that the other parent and children are domiciled elsewhere is not sufficient to invoke subsection (a).
- A district court’s failure to expressly address every factor in the § 40-7-108(2), MCA, inconvenient-forum list is not error if the omitted factors are immaterial to the conclusion; a court need not go through each factor mechanically when the dispositive considerations—here, exclusive judicial familiarity and demonstrated efficiency—clearly support retaining jurisdiction.
- Seeking to transfer UCCJEA jurisdiction when circumstances are substantially the same as when the original parenting plan was entered raises forum-shopping concerns; under In re M.M.K., courts are entitled to consider those concerns in the inconvenient-forum analysis.
Why It Matters
For Montana family law practitioners, In re Marriage of Ramsey illustrates the UCCJEA’s built-in resistance to mid-stream forum transfers in interstate custody cases. As long as the party seeking transfer still lives in Montana, Montana courts retain jurisdiction under § 40-7-202(1)(b)—regardless of where the children and the other parent reside. A respondent who remained in Montana after dissolution cannot strategically trigger a UCCJEA transfer simply because the children are living in another state; the statute’s architecture contemplates that situation and leaves jurisdiction in place until both parents and the children have left Montana.
The case also reinforces that the “significant connection” and “inconvenient forum” arguments carry real briefing requirements. Appellate courts will not construct the analytical framework for an appellant who invokes a statutory subsection but fails to address its substantive elements. Practitioners seeking to transfer UCCJEA jurisdiction must affirmatively address why both the significant-connection test and every material factor of the inconvenient-forum test favor the transfer—a partial argument will fail.