Background
Robert Jackson Jore received a Department of Corrections commitment of 13 months followed by five years in Montana State Prison, all suspended, for a fourth or subsequent DUI offense. After completing the WATCh program, he began community supervision in February 2023. The State later sought revocation based on alleged violations that included alcohol consumption and failure to complete a chemical-dependency evaluation. Jore admitted the violations at an adjudicatory hearing, and additional alcohol-related violations were alleged before disposition.
At the August 2024 disposition hearing, the District Court asked whether Jore was entitled to credit for jail time or time spent under community supervision. Defense counsel said that, as far as counsel knew, Jore was entitled to one day under the original judgment. After the prosecutor cited the probation officer’s recommendation against street-time credit, both sides agreed that one day was appropriate. The court revoked Jore’s suspended sentence and imposed three years in prison with one day of credit.
On appeal, Jore argued that Montana law entitled him to 276 additional days of elapsed-time credit because the record did not identify violations during those periods of supervision.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Jore waived his challenge to the elapsed-time calculation because defense counsel affirmatively agreed to the one-day figure at disposition and neither counsel nor Jore requested a different calculation or objected to the denial of additional street-time credit.
The court explained that the District Court expressly considered the credit issue by asking the parties about it, and Jore had notice of the probation officer’s position and an opportunity to object. Under the court’s recent decisions in State v. Pajnich and Williams v. Green, a sentencing court may rely on the parties’ specific agreed calculation, and an unpreserved challenge to that calculation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Because Jore did not ask the District Court to identify violation-free periods, call the probation officer to address the record and recollection of violations, or otherwise dispute the State’s position, the court did not reach the merits of his claimed 276 days. It also concluded that the three-year sentence was within statutory parameters. The nonprecedential memorandum opinion therefore affirmed the revocation judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant must object at the revocation disposition hearing if the proposed elapsed-time credit omits periods the defendant believes were violation-free.
- A sentencing court may rely on a specific credit calculation affirmatively accepted by both parties without separately explaining why additional, unrequested elapsed time was denied.
- Jore’s stipulation to one day of credit and failure to seek a period-by-period calculation waived his appellate challenge.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the importance of preserving elapsed-time disputes during revocation proceedings. Defense counsel seeking street-time credit should identify the claimed violation-free periods, dispute contrary recommendations, and create a record concerning the probation officer’s records and recollection.
The opinion is a noncitable memorandum decision and does not serve as precedent, but it illustrates how the Montana Supreme Court applies its preservation and waiver rules when the parties agree to a specific credit calculation at sentencing.