Background
William Forbes and Cindy Burbank were the only candidates in the Nebraska Democratic Party’s 2026 U.S. Senate primary. Burbank defeated Forbes, then timely declined the nomination under Nebraska law. The Secretary of State accordingly announced that Burbank’s name would not appear on the general-election ballot.
Forbes sued the party, asserting that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-627 required it to nominate a replacement. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Lancaster County District Court granted summary judgment to the party, concluding that the relevant statutes permitted—but did not require—the party to fill the vacancy. Forbes appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. It first held that Forbes, as a longtime registered Democratic voter, had standing. Assuming his statutory claim was valid for standing purposes, he had a personal legal interest in whether his party nominated a candidate, one distinct from the public’s general interest.
On the merits, the court held that § 32-623 provides discretion: a vacancy created by a timely nomination declination “may be filled” under § 32-627. Section 32-627’s use of “shall” mandates the process a party must use if it elects to fill a vacancy; it does not compel a party to fill every vacancy. Because that reading harmonized both provisions, the party had no legal duty to nominate a replacement for Burbank.
Key Takeaways
- A registered party voter had standing to challenge the party’s asserted statutory duty to nominate a replacement candidate.
- A timely withdrawal creates a ballot vacancy that a political party may, but need not, fill.
- Section 32-627 governs the required method for filling a vacancy when a party chooses to do so.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that Nebraska political parties retain discretion to leave a general-election ballot position vacant after their nominee timely withdraws. The statutory procedure for replacement becomes mandatory only once a party decides to fill the vacancy.
Justice Cassel dissented solely on standing, concluding that Forbes’ interest was not sufficiently distinct from that of the public and that the appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.